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ABSTRACT
BROAD-BASED EQUITY COMPENSATION, EMPLOYEE TURNOVER, AND
UNIT PERFORMANCE
Marshall D. Vance
Christopher D. Ittner

This study, which consists of two essays, examines the performance effects of a deferred
equity plan on both individual employee and business unit outcomes. The first essay
investigates the effects of deferred compensation plan characteristics on voluntary
turnover decisions, using detailed data on store-level employees of a large retail firm.
Overall, I find that employees who are eligible to receive deferred profit-sharing
payments have significantly lower voluntary turnover. However, the relation between
eligibility and turnover varies depending upon the specific plan eligibility requirement
(i.e., age, tenure, hours worked per year), with stronger retention effects when plan
contributions are larger. Vesting restrictions are associated with lower turnover rates, but
only among non-managerial store employees. Finally, the retention benefits from
unvested plan holdings are driven primarily by deferred compensation that is invested in
the company’s stock rather than in diversified mutual funds. These findings suggest that
employees may respond to the retention incentives provided by a deferred compensation
plan, but that specific plan characteristics play a key role in determining the plan’s
retention benefits. The second essay examines the effects of equity compensation on unit
performance at the same retail firm. Prior studies have argued that providing noniv

managerial employees “a piece of the pie” through equity compensation is a means to
improve firm performance, while critics contend that the free-rider problem will negate
the performance effects of broad-based employee ownership. I find that equity
compensation is positively associated with unit profitability. While I find that reduced
employee turnover mediates the relationship between equity compensation and
performance, the evidence suggests that effort incentives are the primary source of
performance effects.
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1. Introduction
Over one-third of all workers employed by for-profit corporations in the U.S.
receive equity compensation, and much of this compensation is deferred through vesting
provisions (NCEO, 2013). Notwithstanding the widespread popularity of these
compensation plans, two important questions have not been resolved in the prior
literature. First, prior research has produced limited and mixed findings for the
performance effects associated with broad-based equity plans. Second, while previous
research suggests the deferred aspects of these compensation plans can reduce employee
turnover, the importance of specific compensation plan characteristics (e.g., eligibility
and vesting provisions, grant sizes, and investment choices) is not well understood.
This dissertation is organized into two essays. In the first essay I examine the
retention impact of specific characteristics of a deferred compensation plan. I find that
employees who are eligible to receive plan contributions have significantly lower
turnover rates than employees who do not meet eligibility requirements. The effect of
eligibility is stronger for higher levels of plan contributions, and varies with employee
characteristics. I also find that unvested plan holdings are associated with reduced
employee turnover, but the retention effects are concentrated in holdings invested in
company stock as opposed to diversified mutual funds.
In the second essay I investigate the effect of equity compensation on unit-level
performance. On the one hand, practitioners and academics have long argued that giving
employees “a piece of the pie” through equity ownership can improve effort incentives,
and therefore improve company performance. On the other hand, economic theory
1

suggests that firm-level incentives are too diffuse to have a meaningful impact on
employee behavior, and therefore other motivations, such as employee retention, have
been proposed. I find that equity compensation is positively associated with unit
performance. Moreover, I find that employee turnover is one channel through which
equity compensation can impact performance. However, the association between equity
compensation and unit performance remains positive and significant even after
controlling for employee turnover, suggesting that turnover does not fully mediate the
relationship between broad-based equity and unit performance, as recent studies have
suggested.
Prior empirical evidence for the performance effects of broad-based equity and
deferred compensation has been limited in part due to a lack of detailed compensation
data available below the executive level. Two primary issues have limited the ability of
prior research to make inferences about the performance consequences of broad-based
equity plans. First, the endogenous choice to adopt a broad-based equity plan makes it
difficult to compare adopting firms to non-adopters, yet the majority of prior research has
taken this approach. Second, prior research has typically used broad, cross-sectional
samples, with only high-level information on the extent to which firms grant equity
below the executive ranks. This approach treats broad-based equity plans across firms as
homogenous, even though the plans may differ in important ways, such as the extent of
employee eligibility or the level of equity compensation.
I utilize a unique dataset comprising records and unit performance data for a large
retail firm that uses an Employee Share Ownership Plan (ESOP). Detailed data within a
single firm reduces the endogeneity problem because all units in the firm participate in
2

the same plan, and the choice to participate in the plan is relatively exogenous from the
employees’ perspective, conditional on choosing to work for the firm. Moreover, the
detailed data allows me to investigate the importance of specific characteristics
associated with the plan’s design.
Collectively, these two essays show that deferred equity compensation can impact
employee behavior and unit performance, but achieving desired effects depends on plan
design. This research has implications for practitioners seeking to implement new equity
or deferred compensation plans, or to justify and get the most out of an existing plan.
Moreover, by documenting performance effects of a broad-based equity compensation
plan, these essays are useful to academics seeking to understand the popularity of these
compensation arrangements in practice.

3

2. Deferred Compensation Plan Characteristics and Voluntary
Employee Turnover
2.1. Introduction
Considerable research has examined the influence of compensation characteristics
on employee behavior and firm outcomes. This research has primarily focused on the use
of compensation for incentive purposes (e.g., Prendergast, 1999; Merchant et al., 2003).
However, firms use compensation plans to achieve a number of other objectives, with
employee retention among the most important.1 Many compensation professionals and
academic researchers contend that firms can increase retention (i.e., reduce voluntary
employee turnover) through the use of deferred pensions, profit-sharing plans, 401(k)
matching, and equity grants (e.g., Lazear, 1990; Oyer and Schaefer, 2005). These
compensation mechanisms defer payouts by making them explicitly contingent on the
employee staying with the firm for some specified amount of time, typically through the
use of tenure-based eligibility and vesting restrictions.2
A key issue in the design of deferred compensation plans is the influence of
specific plan characteristics (e.g., eligibility requirements, vesting schedules, size of
deferred grants, investment vehicle) on employee turnover decisions. Labor economists
such as Lazear (1990, p. 263) argue that “turnover rates are fundamentally influenced by

1

For example, surveys by the compensation consulting firm PayScale found that retaining and attracting
good talent were the two chief compensation objectives for both 2010 and 2011.
(http://www.werc.org/assets/1/Publications/924a%201_13905_PayScales_Compensation_Practices_Survey
[1].pdf, accessed November 22, 2011)
2
Throughout this chapter, I use the phrase “deferred compensation” to mean compensation that is explicitly
contingent on tenure requirements. In other contexts, deferred compensation can refer more narrowly to the
practice of executives voluntarily deferring a portion of current pay to achieve tax objectives (e.g.,
Anantharaman et al., 2011), or the practice of delaying the determination of contingent pay due to
uncertainty with respect to performance measurement (e.g., Jackson and Lazear, 1991).

4

the structure of deferred compensation.” Yet most empirical studies to date have ignored
this issue, instead focusing on the cross-sectional association between the presence of
deferred compensation plans and employee turnover rates (e.g., Allen et al., 1993; Evan
and Macpherson, 1996; Azfar and Danninger, 2001), and largely ignoring whether
specific plan characteristics have differential effects on employee retention.3
This chapter addresses this limitation using ten years of detailed data on
individual, store-level employees of a large retail firm. The firm’s deferred profit-sharing
plan covers all store-level employees from entry-level customer service representatives to
store managers, with lower turnover one of the plan’s primary objectives.4 Although any
single-firm study faces generalizability concerns, this sample offers a number of
significant advantages for investigating the retention benefits from different plan
characteristics. First, the plan’s eligibility cutoffs and vesting schedules are based on age,
tenure, and the number of hours worked during each year, allowing me to identify and
test for discontinuities in individual employees’ retention incentives that arise from the
plan cutoffs and vesting schedules. Second, some of the plan’s provisions, including the
minimum age for eligibility, the percentage of firm profits contributed to the plan, the
length of the vesting schedule, and the investment of plan assets (company stock or
diversified mutual fund) changed during the sample period, providing natural
experiments to test the effects of these characteristics on employee retention. Finally, the
detailed, employee-level data allow an examination of claims regarding the importance of

3

Exceptions include Kole (1997) and Cadman et al. (2011), which examine vesting terms for executive
stock options as a function of proxies for retention importance.
4
Similar deferred profit-sharing plans are used by more than eleven thousand U.S. firms to cover more than
thirteen million employees, an increase of more than 333% over the last thirty years (NCEO, 2011).
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employee characteristics in deferred compensation design (e.g., Salop and Salop, 1976;
Rosenbloom, 2005).
Using hazard analysis, I find that employees who are eligible to receive
contributions under the deferred compensation plan have significantly lower turnover
rates than employees who do not meet the eligibility requirements. Plan eligibility is
associated with a 15–35% reduction in turnover rates, which corresponds to an expected
employment length increase of 17 –54% for the average employee. The effect of
eligibility on turnover is stronger for larger values of deferred compensation grants.
Turnover is not significantly different between employees just below the age or
tenure cutoffs and those just above the cutoffs. However, employees who receive
deferred compensation by working just over the annual hour cutoff exhibit lower turnover
rates than do employees who work just under the required number of hours. The plan
eligibility retention effects are stronger for females than for males, and for older workers
than for younger workers. To the extent that these characteristics proxy for employees’
discount rates, these results are consistent with prior evidence that women have lower
discount rates than men (thereby increasing the expected value of deferred
compensation), and that discount rates decrease with age (e.g., Warner and Pleeter,
2001).
Because unvested deferred compensation is forfeited if the employee leaves the
firm, unvested plan holdings may have a greater influence on voluntary turnover
decisions than vested holdings (e.g., Core and Guay, 2001; Kedia and Rajgopal, 2009).
Consistent with this argument, I find a negative and significant association between the
value of unvested plan holdings and voluntary turnover, but only for employees at the
6

lowest organizational level. For these employees, an additional $1,000 of unvested
holdings is associated with a 26% turnover rate reduction. This reduced turnover rate
corresponds to a 35% longer expected employment duration. I also find that the retention
effects of unvested holdings are primarily driven by deferred compensation invested in
the company’s stock, and not by investments in diversified stock holdings. In contrast to
non-managerial employees, unvested holdings are not statistically associated with
reduced turnover rates for store managers, suggesting that unvested holdings do not
provide strong retention incentives to these employees, who tend to have higher current
pay and greater investments in firm-specific human capital.
This chapter contributes to the literature on compensation design and employee
turnover in three ways. First, I extend prior research by examining whether specific
characteristics of a deferred compensation plan are associated with employee turnover
rates. Beyond the decision of whether to adopt a deferred compensation plan, employers
face a number of different choices in designing a plan to meet their retention objectives.
The evidence in this chapter suggests that some plan characteristics are associated with
reduced turnover while others appear to have no effect, thus highlighting the importance
of examining specific plan characteristics when investigating deferred compensation plan
outcomes.
Second, I am better able to overcome the endogeneity problem that has limited
prior research on the retention benefits from deferred compensation. Although I do not
directly examine whether the existence of a deferred compensation plan affects voluntary
turnover, my findings that certain characteristics influence employee turnover are
consistent with the plan having retention effects. Prior studies have attempted to
7

investigate the broad question of whether deferred compensation plans reduce employee
turnover, with mixed results (e.g., Allen et al., 1993; Gustman and Steinmeir, 1993; Azfar
and Danninger, 2001). One empirical difficulty in these cross-sectional studies is
overcoming the endogenous decision to adopt such a plan in order to establish a causal
relationship. My analysis of employee-level decisions in a single firm reduces this
problem because the deferred compensation plan is relatively exogenous from the
employees’ perspective.
Third, although many studies have examined the determinants and consequences
of compensation design for executives, relatively little is known about how design
choices impact employees below the executive level. Research on the use of
compensation design to mitigate employee turnover has generally focused on executives
(e.g., Chen, 2004; Balsam and Miharjo, 2007; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). In
contrast, the setting for this chapter includes customer-facing store employees. For nonexecutive employees, a number of factors may attenuate the retention effects related to
plan characteristics. For example, non-executive employees often fail to understand the
provisions of deferred compensation plans in which they are eligible to participate (e.g.,
Mitchell, 1988; Luchak and Gunderson, 2000; Budd, 2008). In addition, deferred
compensation for non-executive employees is commonly implemented as part of a
qualified retirement plan to take advantage of tax savings. Regulatory requirements for
these tax-qualified plans restrict the range of flexibility in designing eligibility criteria
and vesting requirements, potentially diminishing the effect of various plan provisions on
voluntary turnover. By examining the retention effects of deferred compensation plan
characteristics in a setting made up of non-executive workers, this chapter responds to
8

calls for research on compensation for employees at lower organizational levels (e.g.,
Indjejikian, 1999).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, I
provide an overview of theoretical predictions related to the link between deferred
compensation and turnover, discuss the research setting, and develop hypotheses related
to the retention effects of the research site’s specific deferred compensation plan
characteristics and institutional setting. Section 2.3 discusses the sample and measures
used for the empirical analysis. In Section 2.4, I present my results. Conclusions are
provided in section 2.5.

2.2. Theory, Research Setting, and Hypotheses
2.2.1 Deferred compensation characteristics and employee turnover

Although prior research posits a number of motivations for the use of deferred
compensation, such as taking advantage of tax benefits (Black, 1980; Tepper, 1981),
providing effort incentives (Lazear, 1979; Lazear, 1981) and attracting high-quality
employees (Salop and Salop, 1976), practitioners and academics alike cite reduced
voluntary turnover as one of the most direct benefits of deferred compensation. Recent
surveys, for example, show that employers list retention as a primary reason for offering
defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans to workers, and employers believe
such plans directly impact employee turnover (Diversified Investment Advisors, 2006;
Grant Thornton, 2010). Similarly, economic theories argue that deferred compensation in
general can be an effective tool for reducing employee turnover (e.g., Lazear, 1990).
Other researchers contend that retention is a prime motivation for several specific forms
of deferred compensation, including deferred profit-sharing plans and Employee Share
9

Ownership Plans (ESOPs) (Kruse, 1996; Azfar and Danninger, 2001; Rosenbloom,
2005), pensions (Ippolito, 1991), and broad-based equity plans with vesting restrictions
(Core and Guay, 2001; Ittner et al., 2003; Oyer and Schaefer, 2005).5
The argument for using deferred compensation to reduce voluntary turnover is
straightforward. Because new compensation grants and/or vesting of previous grants are
explicitly linked to tenure requirements, employees face increased implicit costs of
quitting before tenure requirements are reached. However, the retention benefits from
deferred compensation are likely to be driven not merely by the existence of such a plan,
but also by the specific plan characteristics.
Eligibility rules, for example, can affect retention incentives by stipulating which
employees participate in the plan. Holding current pay fixed, eligibility to receive
deferred compensation increases future payouts, conditional on remaining with the firm
(e.g., Lazear, 1979). The higher the present value of total compensation (i.e., current plus
deferred), the less likely an outside offer will exceed the pay at the incumbent job, and
therefore the less likely an employee will be to leave the firm.
The amount of money contributed to the plan is also likely to affect voluntary
turnover because contribution size determines the difference in retention incentives
between employees who are eligible and those who are ineligible for plan grants. Along
these lines, Blasi et al. (2008) provide survey evidence that the size of profit-sharing
5

Several studies use firm-level data to examine whether the use of deferred compensation is related to
retention-oriented compensation objectives. Using survey data on stated compensation objectives,
Ryterband (1991) finds that reducing employee turnover is a primary objective among ESOP adopters,
while Gerakos et al. (2011) find a negative relationship between retention objectives and the use of broadbased stock options. Core and Guay (2001) and Oyer and Schaefer (2005) use proxies for the relative
importance of retention and find that these retention proxies are significant determinants of broad-based
stock option grants.
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contributions as a percentage of total pay is negatively associated with self-reported
intention to seek a new job.
Vesting terms can provide retention incentives by extending the time horizon of
payouts (Kole, 1997; Cadman et al., 2011). Prior research specifically cites unvested
holdings as being especially effective in discouraging employees from quitting, because
any outside opportunity must compensate the employee for unvested holdings that would
be forfeited on departure (e.g., Core and Guay, 2001; Kedia and Rajgopal, 2009).
Consistent with this intuition, Balsam and Miharjo (2007) find that the value of unvested
equity holdings is negatively associated with voluntary turnover for their sample of
executives.
Finally, the retention effects of unvested holdings depend on the value of the
holdings to the employee, because the subjective value represents the perceived cost of
forfeiture. Employees’ valuation of unvested holdings, and thus the associated retention
effects, may depend on whether plan assets are invested in company stock or diversified
investment vehicles. Prior research indicates that employees exhibit a preference for
investments in employer stock (e.g., Huberman, 2001; Cohen, 2009), notwithstanding
portfolio theory’s clear prescriptions for diversification. Survey evidence indicates that
employees actually consider company stock to be a less risky investment than a
diversified equity portfolio (John Hancock Financial Services, 2002). Other studies
suggest that owning company stock per se can increase employees’ identification with
the firm, and consequently improve loyalty and reduce voluntary turnover (e.g., Pierce et
al., 1991; Kruse and Blasi, 1997; Blasi et al., 2008). All of these arguments imply that
investing deferred contributions in company stock will yield stronger retention
11

incentives. In contrast, recent studies highlight the cost of under-diversification
associated with employees’ investments in their companies’ stock (e.g., Meulbroek,
2005; Poterba, 2003; Cohen, 2009). If employees recognize the costs of underdiversification, they may steeply discount investments in company stock, reducing the
retention effects of company stock relative to diversified investments.
Although a number of studies have examined whether the existence of a deferred
compensation plan is associated with reduced voluntary turnover,6 relatively little
evidence exists on the influence of specific plan characteristics on employee retention,
despite their theoretical importance to plan outcomes. Given this limitation, I extend prior
deferred compensation studies by examining the association between eligibility rules,
plan contributions, vesting schedules, and plan investment vehicles on voluntary turnover
rates.
2.2.2 Research setting

I conduct my analyses using records for store-level employees of a large U.S.
retail firm. This setting is well-suited for studying retention incentives because the firm
experiences high employee turnover and reducing turnover is an important organizational
objective. Although the sample firm’s voluntary turnover rate is generally lower than
those of its industry peers, it is still very high compared to rates for other industries. Over

6

Most research in this area uses data from broad employment and compensation surveys to compare
employee turnover rates at firms using and not using deferred compensation (e.g., Azfar and Danninger,
2001; Ippolito, 1987; 1991; Allen et al., 1993; Evan and Macpherson, 1996). These studies generally find
that firms with deferred compensation plans have lower turnover. However, Gustman and Steinmeier
(1993) find that, after controlling for appropriate job-and firm-level characteristics, the link between
deferred compensation and turnover is not significant. Allen et al. (1993) and Evan and Macpherson (1996)
also find limited evidence that deferred compensation reduces voluntary turnover, as opposed to layoffs or
other forms of non-voluntary employee departure.
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the sample period, voluntary turnover averaged nearly 75 percent annually and reached
nearly 100 percent annually among employees at the lowest organizational level.
The firm’s strategy involves generating repeat customer business by offering
excellent customer service and fostering a sense of community in its stores. A key
component of this strategy is a focus on customer-employee interactions, which depend
not only on employee “friendliness,” but also on familiarity between customers and
employees.7
The firm operates a deferred profit-sharing plan, with senior managers citing
reduced employee turnover as one of the plan’s objectives.8 However, management
acknowledged that they do not have any direct evidence that the profit-sharing plan
actually reduces turnover. Under the plan, eligible employees receive an annual
contribution from the company to an individual retirement account that is managed by a
third party. The plan is structured as a qualified retirement plan for Federal income tax
purposes, and current employees are restricted from accessing their funds until after
retirement.9 However, employees can receive distributions from their vested plan

7

Interviews with store managers and other employees provided a number of explanations for a link
between employee turnover and store-level operating performance. First, turnover can lead to lower
customer satisfaction. Repeat customers become familiar with particular employees and expect to see them
when they come in. Employee turnover can also harm a store’s ability to maintain high operating standards
because employee inexperience leads to slower service and longer lines. Longer-tenured employees are
more likely to have mastered the basic routines in the store and thus are able to “focus on the details” to
improve store presentation and meet customers’ needs. Finally, managers cited the drain on their own time
and attention associated with interviewing, hiring, and training new employees. This time-consuming
process directs managers’ efforts away from higher-value activities.
8
In addition to providing retention incentives, management mentioned increasing employee effort as
another goal of the plan. The performance consequences of equity compensation under this plan, whether
from improved retention or employee effort, are the focus of Chapter 3.
9
The primary tax benefits for structuring the deferred compensation program as a retirement plan are that
contributions invested in the plan are not taxed to the employee until ultimately distributed, and investment
returns on plan holdings can grow tax free
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holdings before retirement age if they separate from the company for any reason.10
Structuring deferred compensation as a retirement plan impacts the timing of ultimate
distributions and the administrative details of the plan, but does not otherwise
substantively affect the deferred elements of the plan. The plan is quite general in that it
entails making grants to employees in the current period that will not be fully earned until
later, similar to other common forms of deferred compensation (e.g., restricted stock,
stock options, and pensions). Even so, structuring deferred compensation as a taxqualified plan requires that plan provisions conform to guidelines for tax-qualified plans
outlined by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
2.2.3 Hypotheses

In this section, I develop my hypotheses in the context of the specific
characteristics of the research site’s deferred profit-sharing plan and the firm’s
institutional setting.
2.2.3.1 Eligibility
Plan eligibility provisions impact retention incentives by determining which
employees receive deferred compensation. Holding current pay fixed, eligible employees
effectively earn a higher wage than ineligible employees, and therefore are less likely to
find an outside offer that exceeds the incumbent total compensation (current and
deferred). At the research site, eligibility to receive contributions under the deferred
compensation plan is based on tenure, annual hours worked, and age. The firm has
10

For example, after leaving the company, an employee can elect to receive all of his or her vested
holdings as a cash distribution, or can roll the vested holdings into another retirement account such as an
Individual Retirement Account (IRA). Any cash distribution received before age 59 ½ is subject to an
additional 10% penalty tax by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). If an employee continues to work at the
company beyond the normal retirement age (i.e., age 62), he or she can begin receiving distributions from
plan holdings after age 70 ½ while still working at the firm.
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flexibility under ERISA to choose cutoffs for each of these criteria within an acceptable
range. In particular, ERISA requires tenure cutoffs between zero and twelve months,
annual hours worked cutoffs between zero and 1,000 hours, and age cutoffs that do not
exceed 21 years. For each of these criteria, the firm has used the flexibility within the
ERISA guidelines to adopt the most stringent eligibility requirements allowable for taxqualified plans. Therefore, to be eligible to receive a contribution, a worker must have
been with the firm for at least twelve months, must have worked at least 1,000 hours
during the plan year, and must be at least 21 years old.11
Despite the positive expected value of deferred compensation, the store-level
employees in the sample may not consider the deferred component of compensation
when evaluating potential outside employment opportunities.12 Because the retail
environment is characterized by high turnover rates for entry-level employees, these
employees may consider their employment status to be tenuous, leading them to steeply
discount future payouts that require them to stay with the firm for an extended period of
time.
The uncertain relation between plan eligibility and retention in this setting leads
me to test the prediction that employees consider the deferred component of their total
pay when making stay or quit decisions. If so, eligible employees have stronger
incentives to remain with the firm than ineligible employees, and consequently have
lower turnover rates. Thus, my first hypothesis:
11

The age-21 requirement was imposed beginning with the 2002 plan year due to a change in ERISA rules.
To receive a plan contribution after this date, an employee needs to be age 21 or older, even if they had
received a grant in a previous year.
12
In interviews, managers expressed the belief that store employees disproportionately weight current
hourly pay when evaluating outside employment opportunities.
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H1: Eligibility to receive deferred compensation is negatively associated
with voluntary turnover rates.
2.2.3.2 Level of contributions
Plan eligibility increases retention incentives by increasing the present value of
future wages, but the size of this effect is likely to vary according to the level of
contributions made to the plan. Contribution size at the research site is based on firm
performance, but ultimately is at the discretion of the board of directors. Although there
is no guarantee that the board will decide to make a grant, the company made a grant
every year during the sample period. Annually, the board reviews the performance of the
company and decides on the level of contribution to the plan as a percentage of company
profits. From 2007 – 2009, annual plan contributions were 15% of profits. Prior to that,
grants were 10% of annual profits.
Each employee’s grant is determined mechanically based on a multiplier of his or
her total eligible earnings for the year.13 The multiplier is derived by dividing the total
aggregate contribution to the plan by the aggregate eligible earnings. For example, if total
plan contribution was $100 in a given year (15% of firm profits), and total eligible
employee earnings was $1,000, the “contribution factor” for that year would be
100/1,000 = 10%, meaning that each employee would receive a contribution equal to
10% of his or her eligible earnings during that year. Although the contribution as a
percentage of firm profits was fairly constant over the sample period (with the exception
of the increase for years 2007-2009), the contribution to each employee as a percentage
of eligible earnings varied from year to year, ranging from roughly 4.9% to 11.4%.
13

Eligible earnings include all wages earned after initial plan eligibility is achieved.
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Because employees who are eligible to receive grants under the plan accrue
deferred compensation throughout the year, the effective hourly wage for eligible
employees increases depending upon the size of the annual contribution factor. This
accrued deferred compensation is then contributed to the employees’ accounts at the time
of the annual grant, and is subject to vesting provisions. If employees are aware of the
computation that determines annual deferred compensation grants and are able to form
reasonable expectations of the various inputs (e.g., annual profits and wages earned), then
higher levels of contributions should increase retention incentives for eligible employees.
Therefore, my second hypothesis:
H2: The association between eligibility and voluntary turnover rates is
increasing in the level of plan contributions.
2.2.3.3 Vesting
Tenure-based vesting provisions can provide retention incentives by explicitly
linking employees’ payouts to the length of time they remain with the firm. As a result,
tenure-based vesting schedules are one of the most straightforward means to defer
compensation. As with the company’s other plan provisions, vesting schedules must
conform to ERISA guidelines to maintain the plan’s tax-favored status. Although ERISA
permits either cliff or gradual vesting, the company has chosen to use a gradual vesting
schedule. The maximum length of a permissible vesting schedule changed during the
sample period as a result of a change in legislation governing ERISA. Prior to 2007,
employees under a gradual vesting schedule had to be fully vested after a maximum of
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seven years.14 For 2007 and later, full vesting must be achieved after a maximum of six
years.15 As with its eligibility requirements, the company used the flexibility allowed
within ERISA guidelines to choose the most restrictive vesting requirements available.
For grants made prior to 2007, the vested percentage of plan holdings was 0% for fewer
than three years of service, and 20% per year for three to seven years of service.
Employees were 100% vested in their plan balances after accruing seven years of service.
For grants made in 2007 and later, 20% vesting is achieved with each year of service
from two to six, and employees are 100% vested in these grants after six years of
service.16 Table 2.1 presents the vesting schedule. Other than the pre-/post-2007
distinction, these vesting percentages are applied to the account balances themselves, and
not to specific grants per se. For example, an employee with four years of service who
receives a grant in 2005 is immediately 40% vested in that grant, as well as 40% vested in
any grant received in previous years.
With respect to the choice to use the longest vesting term allowed under ERISA,
company management pointed out that “vesting was structured to promote long-term
commitment to the organization,” consistent with the theory that longer vesting schedules
increase the retention incentives provided by a deferred compensation plan (e.g., Kole,
1997; Cadman et al., 2011). Prior research argues that it is the value of unvested holdings
that has the strongest incentive effects (e.g., Core and Guay, 2001; Kedia and Rajgopal,
2009). Unvested holdings represent compensation that is forfeited if an employee leaves,
14

Vesting is based on the number of years of service an employee has accumulated with the company.
Under the research site’s plan, a “year of service” (YOS) is accrued for every year in which an employee
works at least 1000 hours.
15
Under ERISA, full vesting must be achieved after 3 year if cliff vesting is used.
16
Regardless of years of service, employees achieve 100% vesting when they reach age 62.
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and therefore greater values of unvested grants should increase the employee’s cost of
leaving the firm, leading to my third hypothesis:
H3: The value of unvested holdings is negatively associated with voluntary
turnover rates.
2.2.3.4 Investment of plan assets
The relationship between unvested holdings and voluntary turnover may depend
upon whether plan assets are invested in company stock or in diversified investments by
altering employees’ subjective valuations of their holdings. During the sample period,
plan contributions were invested either in company stock as part of an employee share
ownership plan (ESOP) or in diversified mutual funds. For the years 1999-2002 and
2004-2006, the investment of plan assets was split equally between company stock and
mutual funds. For the years 2003 and 2007-2009, contributions were invested exclusively
in company stock. Whether plan contributions were invested in mutual funds or company
stock did not have any impact on eligibility, contribution factors, vesting, or distribution
of plan holdings, and therefore the ESOP and mutual fund arms of the deferred profitsharing program were the same in all respects other than how the contributions were
invested.
As discussed earlier, psychological factors may cause employees to prefer
company stock, despite portfolio theory’s clear prescription for diversification. In
addition, several studies have shown that employees “excessively extrapolate” company
stock returns into the future (e.g., Bernartzi, 2001; Choi et al., 2003; Huberman and
Sengmueller, 2004). This may be particularly important in this research setting. Over the
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sample period, the firm’s stock significantly outperformed the market.
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If employees

extrapolated the superior company returns into the future, their valuation of investments
in company stock would be higher than those in diversified funds, increasing the
retention effects of ESOP investments vis-à-vis mutual fund holdings. This leads to my
fourth hypothesis:
H4: The association between unvested holdings and voluntary turnover
rates is stronger for company stock holdings than for mutual fund
holdings.
2.2.3.5 Employee characteristics
Although deferred compensation plan characteristics may affect turnover
decisions on average, the extent to which individual employees respond to the retention
incentives in deferred compensation is likely to differ with a number of employee
characteristics (e.g., Salop and Salop, 1976). Rosenbloom (2005) emphasizes the
importance of considering employee demographics in designing a deferred compensation
plan because employees of different age and gender may find different plan features more
or less attractive. For example, risk preferences, discount rates, and labor market
participation are all likely to vary with age and gender (Eckel et al., 1998; Holt and
Laury, 2002; Warner and Pleeter, 2001; Kirby and Markovic, 1996). These differences
could impact an employee’s personal valuation of deferred compensation, and therefore
moderate the extent to which plan characteristics impact the decision to stay with the
firm.
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For ESOP purposes, the firm’s stock is valued annually by a third party.
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Position in the firm is also likely to matter. For example, promotions within a firm
may reflect the extent to which an employee has accumulated firm-specific human
capital. The more human capital an employee has within the firm, the more likely the
employee’s marginal product within the firm exceeds what it would be in a different firm,
and therefore the wage offered by the current firm is more likely to exceed what could be
obtained through an outside offer (e.g., Becker, 1962; Parsons, 1972; Nagypal, 2007). For
this reason, as employees are promoted current pay may provide sufficiently strong
retention incentives so that there is less scope for the deferred compensation plan or its
provisions to impact turnover decisions. Alternatively, employees in higher positions may
better understand plan provisions (e.g., Mitchell, 1988; Luchak and Gunderson, 2000;
Budd, 2008), making it more likely that they will take plan characteristics into account
when deciding whether to leave.
Based on the results in related studies, I predict the retention effects of deferred
compensation characteristics to vary according to employee gender, age, and position in
the firm. Therefore, my fifth hypothesis is as follows:
H5: Employee gender, age, and position moderate the relationship
between deferred compensation characteristics and voluntary turnover
rates.

2.3. Sample and Measures
2.3.1 Data collection

I test these hypotheses using records for all store-level employees hired between
1998 and 2008. The data include employee hire date, termination date and type
21

(voluntary or involuntary), age, gender, wage, and position, as well as the size of grants
to the employee under the company’s deferred profit-sharing plan for plan years 19992008. The sample includes 145,961 unique employees hired between 1998 and 2008,
working a total of 1,773,263 months. I observe 175,558 instances of employee turnover,
of which 127,012 (72.35%) are classified as voluntary.18 To better understand the
deferred compensation plan and institutional setting, I examined official plan
documentation, interviewed corporate employees responsible for administering the plan,
and met with store employees across different organizational levels.
2.3.1.1 Dependent variable
The outcome of interest in this chapter is monthly voluntary turnover for each
employee. The dependent variable vol_turnover equals one in the month a given
employee voluntarily leaves the firm, and zero otherwise. Although there were no layoffs
during the sample period, involuntary turnover occurred due to employees being
terminated.19 20 21
2.3.1.2 Independent variables
As discussed above, eligibility to participate in the deferred profit-sharing plan is
based on cutoffs with respect to age, tenure, and annual hours worked. After satisfying
18

Note that some employees that separate from the firm are re-hired, and may separate again.
Following prior research on voluntary turnover (e.g., Trevor, 2001), I include in the analyses employees
who are involuntarily separated, and the survival analysis treats these observations as being right censored
(i.e., although these employees exit the sample, they do so before voluntary turnover, the event of interest,
is observed). The model accounts for the fact that there was no voluntary turnover during these censored
employees’ tenure.
20
As noted above, some employees leave the firm, are rehired, and then may leave again. In unreported
analyses, I repeat the analyses without allowing these “repeated failures,” removing employees from the
sample after their first separation. Inferences remain unchanged.
21
While there were no layoffs, there were instances of store closings during the sample period, which may
lead to employees with strong geographic preferences to quit (i.e., some employees may be unwilling to
transfer to another store). In unreported tests, I exclude all stores that closed during the sample period, and
results are similar.
19
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the age and tenure requirements, employees are technically eligible to receive a grant
after passing a 1,000-hours-worked threshold. However, I consider employees eligible if
they are on pace to achieve 1,000 hours in a given year, which corresponds to working an
average of 20 hours per week. I do this to avoid coding all employees as non-eligible at
the start of every year, even though they can fully expect to receive a grant at year-end if
they remain with the firm. Specifically, eligible is an indicator variable equal to one if an
employee is at least 21 years old (for years 2002 and later), has been with the firm for at
least 12 months, and worked an average of at least 20 hours per week during the given
year. In addition, I employ indicator variables for the individual eligibility criteria in
additional tests.
Unvested holdings measures the dollar value (in year-2000 terms) of previously
granted holdings that are yet to vest. Employees achieve vesting based on accumulated
“years of service,” defined as the number of years in which an employee worked at least
1,000 hours. I therefore determine when an employee reaches a vesting cutoff by
estimating the month an employee reaches the 1,000-work-hour mark in each year.22
To examine whether the effect of plan characteristics varies with employee
characteristics, I use measures of age, gender, and position in the firm. Age is the
employee’s age in years. Female is an indicator equal to one if the employee is female
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The data for hours worked were provided on an annual basis, so I use the following procedure to estimate
the month of vesting. First, I count the total number of weeks worked during the year, and divide the total
hours worked by the number of weeks to obtain the hours worked per week. Next, I divide 1,000 by hours
per week multiplied by 4.3 (i.e., monthly hours worked). For example, an employee who worked 1,500
hours and was employed for the entire year (52 weeks) would be estimated to vest during September, as
follows: 1,500/52 = 28.85 hours per week. 1,000/(4.3*28.85) = 8.06.

23

and zero otherwise. Positions in the firm include Customer Service Representatives
(CSRs), hourly managers, assistant store managers, and store managers.23
I include a number of control variables drawn from prior literature on employee
turnover (e.g., Griffeth et al., 2000; Trevor, 2001; Benson et al., 2004). Tenure is the total
number of months an employee has worked at the firm. I measure Hourly wage in real
year-2000 dollars to account for the effect of inflation across my sample period. Hours
per week is the total hours worked in a given year divided by the total number of weeks
an individual was employed during the year. In addition to these employee-level
variables, I obtain monthly unemployment rates at the county level from the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics to control for outside employment opportunities in the local labor
market.24 I include year fixed effects to control for changes in macroeconomic factors
(other than unemployment) and company policies across years that affected all
employees equally, and monthly fixed effects to control for seasonal differences in
employee turnover.25
2.3.2 Descriptive statistics

Table 2.2 highlights the differences in employee characteristics across
organizational levels. CSRs are considerably younger, and have shorter tenure than
employees in managerial positions, and earn lower wages working fewer hours per week.
23

Organizational hierarchy at the store level consists of a store manager and an assistant store manager,
both of whom are full-time, salaried employees. Below them are a number of lower-level managers with
responsibility over specific store functions. These positions are paid hourly, but are also full-time. Below
these hourly managers are the Customer Service Representatives, who are paid hourly and may be either
part time or full time.
24
In (unreported) alternative specifications, to control for outside labor opportunities I include the number
of retail stores within the same zip code, scaled by the population within the zip code. Inferences remain
unchanged.
25
To account for the possibility that unobserved, time-invariant store-level are associated with both
deferred compensation and employee turnover decisions, in unreported analyses I include store fixed
effects, and find similar results.
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These differences may result in differential deferred compensation effects across
employee categories. For example, the average CSR tenure (ranging from approximately
15 to 32 months across the sample period) implies that full (100%) vesting is still several
years away for most CSRs. In contrast, managers are much more likely to be in the latter
stages of the vesting schedule. Wages rise sharply with promotions (e.g., store managers’
salaries in 2008 were almost three times higher than those for CSRs). This wage structure
may reflect firm-specific human capital investments and hence wages at these levels
more likely exceed what could be obtained from outside employment opportunities (e.g.,
Ippolito, 1991). Therefore, current pay following promotions may provide sufficiently
powerful retention incentives so that the incremental retention effects from deferred
compensation are small for managers. CSRs tend to work less than a standard “full-time”
work week (mean hours per week ranges from approximately 24 to 29), while all other
employee categories average more than 40 hours per week.
The average values for age, tenure, and weekly hours (Panels B through D)
suggest that nearly all employees above the CSR level are eligible to receive
contributions under the deferred profit-sharing plan. In contrast, there is substantial
variation in CSR eligibility. The total proportion of eligible CSRs has generally increased
over the sample period, with almost 40 percent of CSRs eligible to receive contributions
by 2008. In terms of eligibility requirements, the proportions of employees meeting the
age, tenure, and hours-worked cutoffs all increased over time.26

26

Note that prior to 2002 there was no age eligibility requirement. As a result, the mean and median values
of age requirement for 2000 are both 1.
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Table 2.3 indicates that the correlations among the age, tenure, and weekly hours
cutoffs are all significantly positive. However, the three eligibility cutoffs do not
necessarily collapse into a single eligibility dimension. In unreported analysis, I find that
among CSRs who are not eligible, the most common reason for ineligibility is failure to
meet the tenure requirement. In particular, approximately 20 percent of ineligible CSRs
meet the other two requirements while falling short on tenure, compared to roughly 10 to
15 percent who would be eligible if not for either the age or hours requirement.

2.4. Results
2.4.1 The effect of plan characteristics on voluntary turnover

The primary question for this chapter is the influence of different deferred
compensation plan characteristics on employees’ voluntary turnover decisions.27
Participation in the plan depends on age, tenure, and hours worked, all of which are
observed covariates. In addition, employee wages determine individual grant size, and
hence plan holdings. Prior literature on employee turnover (e.g., Trevor, 2001; Hom and
Kinicki, 2001) suggests that these covariates can have a direct impact on employee
separation decisions, even in the absence of a deferred compensation plan. Thus, the
empirical challenge is to identify the effect of the deferred compensation separately from
the effect of the covariates that determine plan eligibility and grant size. The empirical
strategy I rely on to overcome this challenge is a regression discontinuity (RD) research
27

One of the primary assumptions underlying the research site’s deferred compensation plan is the
(untested) belief that lower voluntary turnover leads to higher store financial performance. If this
assumption is not true, then any relation between plan characteristics and lower turnover will have no
impact on economic performance. I assess the validity of managements’ assumption that lower voluntary
turnover is associated with higher store-level operating performance in section 4.3 of Chapter 2 of this
dissertation.
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design, which has been widely used for program evaluation in the economics literature
(e.g., Thistlewaite and Campbell, 1960; Trochim, 1984; Van Der Klaauw, 2002; DiNardo
and Lee, 2004; Card et al., 2004). Regression discontinuity is appropriate when the
“treatment” of interest (deferred compensation in this case) is determined by whether an
observable covariate (known as a “forcing variable”) is on either side of a threshold.
Even if the covariate determining the treatment is itself associated with the outcome of
interest, the effect of the treatment is still identified under the assumption that the relation
between the forcing variable and the outcome of interest is not discontinuous exactly
around the administrative cutoff.
Following prior literature on organizational turnover (e.g., Trevor, 2001; Hom and
Kinicki, 2001; Benson et al., 2004), I primarily rely on Cox proportional hazard models
to estimate the relationship between deferred compensation and voluntary turnover.
Hazard analysis permits estimating the rate of voluntary turnover over time (i.e., the
“hazard rate”), as opposed to estimating the odds of turnover occurring during some
window of time, as is the case with logistic regression analysis. Rather than treating
employee turnover as a dichotomous decision, hazard analysis implicitly accounts for the
timing of the quit decision, so that an employee who leaves after one month conveys
different information than an employee who separates after one year. Cox hazard models
estimate the hazard rate as a “baseline hazard” (i.e., the hazard rate faced by everyone)
shifted multiplicatively by observed covariates. The general Cox hazard model
specification I use is
h(t|x) = h0(t)exp(β1xplan variable + β2xcontrols)
27

(1)

where h(t|x) is the hazard rate conditional on having lasted until time t, h0(t) is the
baseline hazard, plan variable represents either plan eligibility or plan holdings, and
controls is a vector of the control variables discussed above. Within the hazard analysis
framework, Cox models are commonly used in part because they are non-parametric, in
the sense that no parametrization is assumed for the baseline hazard function and it is left
unestimated.2829
2.4.2 The effect of eligibility on voluntary turnover

My first hypothesis predicts that plan eligibility is negatively associated with
voluntary turnover. To test this, I restrict the sample to include only CSRs, since this is
the only group with meaningful variation in eligibility. Table 2.4 presents the Cox hazard
model results. These and subsequent hazard analysis results are presented with
exponentiated coefficients, which can be interpreted as hazard ratios (i.e., the ratio of
hazard rates) so that values above one indicate an increased rate of voluntary turnover,
and values below one represent a reduced rate of turnover. For example, the coefficient of
.63 for eligible in column 1 indicates that the turnover rate for eligible employees is 37%
(= 1 - .63) lower than the rate for non-eligible employees. An exponentiated coefficient
equal to one represents no turnover effect, and is analogous to a coefficient of zero in an
OLS regression.
28

When a specific parametrization of the baseline hazard can be reasonably assumed, a parametric hazard
model can produce more efficient estimates than the semiparametric Cox model. However, if the assumed
parametrization is not correct, the parametric model can produce biased coefficient estimates.
29
An important assumption required to use the Cox model is proportionality, i.e., the hazard rate for an
individual with one set of values for the covariates is a fixed proportion of the hazard rate for an individual
with a different set of values. This assumptions implies that for covariates that are fixed (e.g., gender), the
coefficient does not vary across time. However, this assumption is not required for covariates that change
with time (Van den Poel and Lariviere, 2003; Allison, 1995), as the majority of covariates in my
specifications do. For the remaining covariates, I test the proportionality assumption using STATA’s
STPHTEST command.
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Column 1 includes an indicator for whether an employee is eligible, along with a
number of control variables. Since this model does not include hours worked or tenure,
eligible likely captures not only the effect of the deferred compensation plan, but also the
underlying covariates that determine eligibility. The identification strategy for RD
designs is to exploit the discontinuity in eligibility that is distinct from the effect of the
continuous forcing variables. To this end, columns 2 and 3 include linear and higher
order functions of the forcing variables tenure and hours per week. By controlling for the
continuous variation in the forcing variables, the eligible indicator can be interpreted as
the effect of plan eligibility per se.30 Columns 2 and 3 indicate that the effect of eligibility
is to reduce the hazard rate by 18.5% and 15%, respectively. While these effects are
smaller than those reported in column 1, they are still statistically significant, suggesting
that at the margins of eligibility requirements, eligibility has a turnover effect beyond the
direct effects of tenure and hours per week. Based on untabulated analyses, the estimated
hazard rate (i.e., voluntary turnover rate) for a non-eligible employee with 12 months
tenure and average values for the other covariates is approximately 7% per month. Given
this turnover rate, the estimated effect of eligibility for an average CSR is to increase the
expected employment duration by roughly 2.5 months.31 For comparison, the estimated
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The necessary assumption for this interpretation is that hours worked and tenure do not have a
discontinuous effect on turnover precisely at the levels required for eligibility (1,000 hours and 12 months,
respectively). This assumption seems reasonable given that the firm chose the most restrictive eligibility
requirements allowable under ERISA. Given that these values represent the boundary of permissible
requirements, they can be thought of as relatively exogenously determined rather than being based on
economically meaningful values with respect to employee behavior.
31
Based on a 7% turnover rate, the expected number of months until turnover would be 14.28 (= 1/.07). A
hazard ratio of .85 suggests a turnover rate of 5.95%, which corresponds to an expectation of 16.8 months
until turnover (= 1/.0595). Note that this comparison involves an abstraction, because in actuality the
hazard rate is expected to change over time. Therefore, while the hazard rate of eligible employees is
expected to stay proportional to ineligible employees, the comparison rate may not stay at 7%.
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hazard ratio for hourly_wage in column 3 is .893, suggesting that an additional dollar of
hourly wage is associated with a reduction in the voluntary turnover rate of almost 11%.
The results reported in columns 1 - 3 represent the average effect of eligibility
across gender and age categories. However, it is likely that employees of different age
and gender face different employment horizons and discount rates, and thus are likely to
respond to the retention incentives implicit in a deferred compensation plan differently.
To investigate whether the effect of eligibility varies with gender, I include an interaction
term between female and eligible in Column 4. The coefficient for the interaction term is
significantly less than one, indicating that the retention effect of eligibility is greater for
females than for males, consistent with women applying a lower discount rate when
valuing deferred compensation than men. The hazard ratio for men is .926, whereas for
women it is .806.32
In Column 5, I interact eligibility with an indicator for employees older than 30
(i.e., roughly the sample mean). The hazard ratio for the eligibility main effect is not
significantly different from one, suggesting that, at the eligibility margins, eligibility is
not associated with reduced turnover for younger employees. However, the eligibility
effect for older employees is significant with a hazard ratio of .805 (i.e., the effect of
eligibility is to reduce the turnover rate for older employees by nearly 20%). This is
consistent with older employees using a lower discount rate to value deferred
compensation than younger employees. Overall, the results presented in Table 2.4
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The interpretation of the coefficient on an interaction term (using hazard ratios) in Cox models is as the
ratio of hazard ratios. For example, dividing .806 by .926 yields .871, which is the coefficient on the
interaction term. In column 4, the hazard ratio for the interaction is based on the sum of the main effect and
the interaction.
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support Hypothesis 1’s prediction that plan eligibility is associated with lower voluntary
turnover rates. However, the effect of eligibility depends upon employee characteristics.
2.4.2.1 Age eligibility requirement
I next test the turnover effects of the three individual eligibility criteria (age,
tenure, and hours worked). First, I examine whether voluntary turnover rates changed for
18- to 20-year old employees before and after the age-21 restriction was put in place in
2002. I restrict the sample to include only employees in this age group, and I only include
the years 1999-2004. In addition, I include only employees who had been with the firm
for more than 12 months and had worked over 20 hours per week. In effect, all
employees in this sample were eligible to receive deferred compensation before 2002,
and none were eligible from 2002 onwards. The primary variable of interest for this test
is pre_02, an indicator variable equal to one for the years 1999-2001, and zero otherwise.
If restricting eligibility among this age group weakened retention incentives, the hazard
ratio for pre_02 should be significantly less than one. Because turnover rates among 18to 20-year olds may have changed across these years for reasons other than the change in
eligibility rules, I control for the average monthly turnover rate for all 21-year-old
employees at the firm. 21-year-olds represent an appropriate control group because they
are very close in age to the employees in the sample, but they were not impacted by the
change in eligibility requirements.
The results are presented in Table 2.5. As shown in Column 1, the hazard ratio for
pre_02 is not significantly different from 1, indicating that plan eligibility does not affect
turnover behavior of employees under age 21. The contribution factor (i.e., the
percentage by which an individual’s earnings are multiplied to determine the annual
31

contribution) during this period ranged from approximately five percent to almost sixand-a-half percent (see Table 2.2), which represents an implicit “raise” in the form of
deferred compensation for eligible employees. Yet, it appears employees in this age
category either do not consider the deferred component of pay when making stay or quit
decisions, or else apply a sufficiently large discount to deferred compensation so as to
mute the retention effects of this additional pay. As reported in Column 2, neither males
nor females in the under-21 age group are affected by eligibility, as indicated by the
insignificant hazard ratio on the interaction between pre_02 and female. These results are
consistent with those in Table 2.4 showing that eligibility has no association with
turnover of young employees.
2.4.2.2 Tenure eligibility requirement
I examine whether the tenure cutoff for eligibility influences turnover by testing whether
there is a discontinuity in turnover rates after reaching the 12-month employment
requirement.33 As before, the empirical difficulty is estimating the effect of the eligibility
rule apart from the effect of tenure, which itself is expected to be associated with reduced
turnover. To address this issue, I use a difference-in-difference design to compare the
difference in turnover rates before and after 12 months of tenure for employees who are
otherwise eligible (i.e., are over 21 and work at least 20 hours per week) and employees
who are not. That is, the control group for this test is employees who are not otherwise
eligible, and thus are not affected by the tenure eligibility requirement. The interaction
term over_12xeligible is the difference-in-difference estimator, and a retention effect
33

Once an employee becomes eligible he or she receives written communication from the firm about the
deferred compensation plan, and therefore additional retention effects may arise due to increased visibility
and awareness of the plan.
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associated with this eligibility rule would be reflected by a hazard ratio significantly less
than 1.
As reported in Column 1 of Table 2.6, the estimated hazard ratio is less than one
but is not significant, suggesting that eligibility among employees around the tenure
cutoff does not influence turnover decisions. Turnover rates are particularly high among
employees with low tenure, and these employees may not expect to be with the firm long
enough to become vested in any contributions they received, thus muting any potential
retention effect. Alternatively, notwithstanding efforts to provide materials about the
plan, these employees simply may not be aware of their eligibility status either before or
after reaching the 12 month requirement. To further examine whether the retention effect
varies with employee characteristics, Columns 2 and 3 report hazard ratios for 3-way
interactions of over_12xeligible and indicators for older than 30 and female, respectively.
Although the effect of the 12 month eligibility requirement does not differ across young
and old workers, Column 3 provides weak evidence that turnover rates among female
employees after the 12 month cutoff are lower for eligible employees than for noneligible employees.
2.4.2.3 Annual hours worked eligibility requirement
The third eligibility criterion is working 1,000 hours within each plan year. I test
the effect of this requirement by examining voluntary turnover rates for employees who
either received a grant in the prior year or did not, based on being just above or below the
1,000-hour cutoff.34 In using this design, I assume that receiving a grant increases an
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Note that this is a somewhat different test than for Tables 5–7. Tables 5–7 estimate the effect of
eligibility in the current year on turnover rates, whereas the tests for Table 8 estimate the effect of

33

employee’s awareness of the plan, and increases the employee’s expectation of receiving
a grant in the future. For this test, I focus on the subsample of employees who met the age
and tenure requirements as of the end of the previous year, so that whether an employee
received a grant is only a function of hours worked relative to the cutoff. In addition, to
focus on the discontinuity, the analyses use only employees whose prior-year hours
worked is within a window around the 1,000-hour cutoff (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).
The assumption motivating these tests is that, after controlling for the number of hours
worked within a given window, employees above the cutoff are substantively similar to
those below the cutoff.35 While this assumption is more likely to hold the smaller the
window size, there is a tradeoff of comparability between “treatment” and “control”
subjects and sample size as the window gets larger. Following Imbens and Lemieux’s
(2008) suggestion for RD analyses, I report results for different window sizes.
The estimated results from this RD analysis are reported in Table 2.7. The
variable of interest is above_1000t-1, an indicator equal to one if the employee was above
the hours cutoff in the prior year (and therefore received a grant), and zero otherwise. In
addition to including control variables for other determinants of voluntary turnover, I
include squared and cubed prior-year hours worked to control for the continuous variation
in this forcing variable as flexibly as possible. Although the estimated effect for the
lagged 1,000-hour indicator is negative across window sizes, the relationship is
eligibility in the prior year (i.e., whether or not an employee received a grant). While both age and tenure
(which primarily determine eligibility in the previous two tables) can easily be measured at the monthly
level, hours worked is only measured annually. Therefore, to cleanly define eligible vs. ineligible
employees with respect to the hours worked cutoff, I require hours worked data for the completed year,
which is why for this test I examine the effect of prior-year eligibility on voluntary turnover.
35
In interviews, managers indicated that whether an employee worked 1,200 hours or 800 hours (i.e., my
largest window size) did not represent a meaningful distinction, as both levels were well below the fulltime threshold.

34

significant only for window size of +/- 150 hours (p < .1) and +/- 200 hours (p < .05).36 37
The estimated hazard ratios using the +/- 200 hours window suggest that eligibility to
receive a grant in the prior year reduces the rate of turnover by nearly 35% for employees
near the eligibility cutoff. For a benchmark hazard rate of 7% monthly, these hazard
ratios suggest an increase in expected employment duration of nearly eight months,
representing a roughly 54% increase in expected employment duration. As in Table 2.4,
this estimated effect is large compared to the effect of an additional dollar of hourly
wage. In sum, the results in Tables 2.4–2.7 provide support for Hypothesis 1’s prediction
that eligibility is associated with reduced voluntary turnover. This effect is stronger for
women and for older workers. Moreover, plan eligibility appears to be most important for
employees at the margin of the 1,000-hour cutoff.
2.4.3 Effect of contribution amounts on voluntary employee turnover

I next examine the moderating effect of contribution amounts on the relationship
between eligibility and turnover. The amount of money contributed to the profit-sharing
plan varied from year to year, and the contribution size rose dramatically starting in 2007
due to an increase in the percentage of profits used to compute contributions. Total
contributions were 10% of profits prior to 2007, and 15% from 2007 onwards. This
36

Restricting these tests to only include employees within a relatively small window of hours worked
significantly reduces the sample size for these tests. That the hazard ratio for above_1000t-1 is similar across
windows and is increasing in significance as the sample increases suggests that the tests relying on the
smaller windows may suffer from a lack of statistical power.
37
To address concerns that these results are driven by the size of the window (i.e., comparing employees
who are not comparable due to the difference in hours worked) and not the eligibility distinction, in
unreported analyses I perform “placebo” tests using a window size of +/- 200 around cutoffs of 800 and
1200 hours, respectively. In both these cases the window does not include the true eligibility cutoff. I do
not find that being above these artificial cutoffs has a statistically significant effect on turnover after
controlling for hours worked, with a p-value of .71 and .35 for the 800-and 1200-hour cutoffs, respectively.
Therefore, I conclude that the results reported in Table 2.7 are driven by the eligibility cutoff at 1000 hours,
and not unobservable differences due to the size of the window.
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change resulted in a substantial increase in total contributions, and therefore in the
contribution factor determining individual grants as well. Since the total amount
contributed to the plan is a function of firm profits, the effect of eligibility on turnover is
likely to vary with employees’ expectations of the portion of profits that will be allocated
to the plan. Employees are given detailed quarterly reports of firm performance,
including profits, so it is likely employees can form reasonable expectations of annual
profits throughout the year. I proxy for employees’ expectations of annual contributions
using actual dollar contributions to the plan, scaled by contributions in 1999.38 The
scaling produces an index that captures plan contributions relative to 1999 contributions
(the first year with available data). In addition to the change in percentage of profits
contributed to the plan, in 2007 the firm shortened the vesting schedule by one year due
to a change in ERISA requirements for tax-qualified retirement plans, and also began
investing new contributions exclusively in the ESOP plan.
To control for changes in turnover rates over time that are due to factors other
than changes in the deferred compensation plan, I use a difference-in-difference research
design to compare the change in turnover rates before and after 2007 for both eligible and
non-eligible employees. If changes in plan characteristics influence turnover rates, I
expect the effects to exist only for eligible employees. Table 2.8 reports results from
hazard analyses designed to test the effect of contribution size, as well as the effect of
other changes in plan characteristics on employee turnover. I first examine the average
effect of the combined 2007 changes (i.e., the increase in contribution size, the shorter
vesting schedule, and the exclusive focus on the ESOP) by estimating voluntary turnover
38

I also use actual current and prior year plan contribution percentages and find similar results.
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rates as a function of an indicator variable equal to one for the years 2007 and later, and
zero otherwise. As reported in Column 1, the coefficient on the interaction term
eligiblex2007 is significantly less than 1, indicating that the combined changes in plan
characteristics increased the association between eligibility and reduced voluntary
turnover. Whereas eligibility in the pre-2007 period is associated with a turnover rate
reduction of almost 12%, for 2007 and later eligibility is associated with a turnover
reduction of approximately 24%. To disentangle the effects of contribution size from the
other changes, I include an additional interaction variable contributionxeligible in
Column 2 to investigate whether the eligibility effects vary with contribution size. When
I include both interactions, it is apparent that the entire turnover reduction associated with
plan changes is due to increased contribution levels, with no significant effect from the
other changes. The estimates in Column 2 imply that doubling contribution size
compared to the baseline level in 1999 increases the effect of eligibility on turnover rates
by an additional 4.6%.
Because a change in the vesting period in particular may have different effects
depending on where the employee stands in relation to the vesting schedule, I estimate
the model separately for employees with tenure between 12–36 months and employees
with tenure between 36–84 months. The results in Columns 3 and 4 suggest that a shorter
vesting schedule does not impact the relationship between eligibility and turnover
decisions regardless of tenure. Taken together, the evidence in Table 2.8 supports
Hypothesis 2’s prediction that contribution levels moderate the effect of eligibility on
voluntary turnover.
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2.4.4 The association between unvested holdings and voluntary turnover

I test Hypothesis 3 by estimating Cox hazard models of voluntary turnover rates
as a function of the value of unvested holdings.39 I again control for underlying variables
that determine grant size and are likely to be correlated with turnover rates. Grant size in
a given year is a function of whether the employee is eligible for a grant and the wages
earned during the year. Although I can rely on the discontinuities associated with
eligibility to provide variation in the value of unvested holdings, variation also results
from differences in contribution rates and differences in the return on plan assets across
time. In addition, the value of unvested holdings varies across time for a given employee
as the portion of holdings that are vested changes and as the vesting requirements are
achieved.
I estimate separate hazard models for each position to investigate whether the
effects of unvested holdings varies across organizational levels. In addition, I eliminate
employees who are already fully vested (i.e., employees over age 62 and employees with
tenure over 7 years). Columns 1 through 4 of Table 2.9 report hazard ratios for CSRs,
hourly managers, assistant store managers, and store managers, respectively. Column 1
shows that an additional $1,000 of unvested holdings reduces the rate of voluntary
turnover by almost 26% for CSRs. Control variable results are also generally consistent
with expectations and previous tests. However, as seen in Columns 2 through 4, there is
no significant relationship between the value of unvested holdings and voluntary turnover
for managerial employees. As discussed earlier, employees in hourly manager and higher
39

Alternatively, it may be the case that the impact of unvested holdings on turnover behavior depends on
the size of the holdings relative to the employee’s non-deferred wages (i.e., $1 of unvested holdings may
mean more to an employee earning $10/hour as opposed to $15. To address this possibility, in unreported
tests I scale the value of unvested holdings by weekly_wage, and inferences remain unchanged.
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positions differ substantially from their CSR counterparts in terms of age, tenure, wage,
and hours worked. These differences may create other, more powerful retention
incentives that crowd out the effect of unvested holdings. For example, the higher wages
associated with promotions may exceed what employees with these skills can obtain
elsewhere. If current pay provides sufficiently powerful incentives for managerial
employees to stay, unvested holdings may provide little incremental retention incentive.40
Alternatively, the quality of outside opportunities available to employees above the CSR
level may be substantially greater, increasing the likelihood that a job change more than
compensates managerial employees for forfeited holdings. Another possibility is that
after accumulating sufficient tenure to be promoted, employees in higher positions
recognize a superior fit with the firm, and therefore are reluctant to leave (e.g., Jovanovic,
1979; Mitchell et al., 2001). Consistent with the latter explanation, voluntary turnover
rates are dramatically lower for employees above the CSR level. Thus, for employees
above the CSR level, there may simply be less scope for deferred compensation to
influence turnover decisions to begin with.
Because vested holdings are highly correlated with unvested holdings and
potentially provide countervailing incentives to separate from the firm (i.e., an employee
cannot cash out of his or her vested holdings until after leaving the firm), I include vested
holdings as an additional control in models 5 through 8. As before, unvested holdings are
40

Another potential explanation is that while the overall effect of unvested holdings is not significant, there
is a significant effect for employees whose holdings are above some threshold. For example, while low
levels of unvested holdings may not provide enough incentive to influence turnover decisions, at higher
levels the effect begins to manifest. I explore this possibility in two unreported analyses. First, I replace
unvested_1000 with indicator variables for terciles within each position group, to test whether a “high”
level of holdings has a retention effect. Second, I include separate variables for unvested_1000 for each
tercile of holdings within each position group to explore whether the effect depends on the level of
unvested holdings. In both sets of analyses, I fail to find significant effects of unvested holdings.
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associated with lower CSR turnover rates, but have no significant association with
reduced turnover of managerial employees.41 In addition, I find no significant
relationship between vested holdings and voluntary turnover, suggesting that employees
do not tend to leave the firm in order to access vested plan holdings. These results
provide mixed support for Hypothesis 3. While unvested holdings are significantly
associated with reduced voluntary turnover among CSRs, there is no association for
managerial employees.
2.4.4.1 Investment of plan holdings
Table 2.10 investigates whether retention effects differ depending upon whether
plan contributions are invested in company stock or diversified mutual funds. I conduct
tests similar to those in Table 2.9, but replace total unvested holdings with separate
variables for holdings invested in the firm’s ESOP and holdings invested in diversified
funds. For CSRs, $1,000 of unvested ESOP holdings is significantly associated with a
turnover rate reduction of nearly 32%. In contrast, the hazard ratio for unvested mutual
fund holdings is closer to one (indicating a 12% reduction in turnover rate) and is not
significant at conventional levels (p = .10). This evidence suggests that among CSRs, the
retention effects of unvested holdings are driven primarily by the holdings invested in
employer stock. However, consistent with the total holdings results in Table 2.9, I do not
find a significant relationship for either unvested ESOP or mutual fund holdings when
examining employees above the CSR level. In Columns 5 through 8, I control for the
41

Contrary to expectations, Column 8 of Table 10 reports that unvested holdings are associated with
increases in turnover rates among store managers. Due to the relatively small sample size for this test and
the high correlation between vested and unvested holdings, it is possible that this represents a spurious
result due to multicollinearity. When either unvested or vested holdings are included in the model
separately, there is no significant association with turnover for store managers.
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value of total vested holdings and find similar results.42 In particular, although the hazard
ratio for unvested diversified holdings is less than one (p < .10), the effect of unvested
ESOP is larger and the difference in these hazard ratios is highly significant (p < .01
level). The results in Table 2.10 suggest that deferred compensation that is invested in
company stock is particularly effective for reducing employee turnover. This finding is
consistent with Hypothesis 4 and supports claims that broad-based equity plans are
especially beneficial for achieving retention objectives (e.g., Oyer and Schaefer, 2005).

2.5. Conclusion
This chapter utilizes detailed records from a large retail firm to examine the
retention effects of deferred compensation plan characteristics. I rely on eligibility cutoffs
for plan participation to identify discontinuities in employees’ retention incentives related
to the plan. I find that plan eligibility is associated with a statistically significant decrease
in the rate of voluntary turnover of non-managerial employees. Among these employees,
plan eligibility is associated with a decrease in voluntary turnover of between 15–35%.
However, the eligibility effect depends upon the specific eligibility requirement, the size
of contributions, and employee characteristics. In additional tests, I find that the value of
unvested plan holdings is associated with reduced turnover rates among low-level
employees, and this effect is stronger when unvested plan assets are invested in company
stock. In contrast, I do not find a significant, negative relationship between unvested
42

In Table 11 Columns 5-8 I control for total vested holdings rather than controlling separately for vested
ESOP and mutual funds due to concerns with multicollinearity. The correlation between vested ESOP and
mutual funds is particularly high, and VIFs for the separate vested components are both over five. When
vested ESOP and mutual fund holdings enter the model individually, both components of unvested
holdings are significantly negatively associated with voluntary turnover. In addition, vested ESOP holdings
are not significantly associated with turnover, while vested mutual fund holdings are significantly
positively associated with voluntary turnover. Because the focus of Table 11 is on the effect of investment
allocation for unvested holdings, I do not conduct further analysis of the components of vested holdings.
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holdings and voluntary turnover for employees in management positions. Collectively,
my results suggest that employees may respond to the retention incentives implicit in
deferred compensation plan characteristics, but that the strength of these incentives is
determined both by specific plan characteristics (e.g., eligibility criteria, level of
contributions, and investment allocation of plan assets) and employee characteristics (i.e.,
discount rates and position in the organizational hierarchy).
An important limitation of my study is the use of data from a single large firm,
and therefore generalizing these results to other firms in different settings should be done
with caution. Nevertheless, focusing on a single firm allows me to capture employee data
and plan characteristics at a level of detail unavailable in any broad-sample dataset. Using
detailed, employee-level data, as well as having access to plan documentation to identify
discontinuities in retention incentives, allows me to construct powerful tests of the effects
of plan characteristics on voluntary turnover.
This research has implications for academics studying the retention effects of
deferred compensation. Prior research has generally examined whether the existence of a
deferred compensation plan is associated with reduced turnover, but my results suggest
that the characteristics of a plan determine retention incentives at the employee level. In
addition, the findings of this chapter should interest practitioners designing deferred
compensation plans, as I document that employee characteristics moderate the
relationship between deferred compensation and voluntary turnover. This suggests that a
“one size fits all” approach to designing deferred compensation plans may not result in
the desired retention effects among all employee groups.
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3. The Impact of Broad-Based Equity Compensation on Business Unit
Performance
3.1. Introduction
Despite the widespread practice of rewarding individual, non-executive
employees based on firm-level outcomes, there is ongoing debate in the literature about
the rationale underlying its popularity (e.g., Oyer and Schaefer, 2005; Hall and Murphy,
2003). At the center of this debate is a lack of consensus about the performance
consequences of these common pay practices. A key point in this debate is whether this
form of “pay for performance” can provide effort incentives for non-executive
employees. Critics of the incentive view argue that freeriding will crowd out incentive
effects (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), and therefore there should be no positive
performance effects from broad-based equity plans. This argument is particularly relevant
for employees at lower levels of the organization, whose individual effort is unlikely to
have any discernible influence on firm-level performance.
On the other side of the debate, academics and practitioners have argued that
equity compensation can provide incentives, and thus improved firm performance, by
giving employees a “piece of the pie” (Freeman et al., 2010). In addition to the typical
pay-for-performance arguments for inducing increased employee effort, proponents argue
that equity compensation can also improve cooperation and innovation by helping
employees “think like owners” (e.g., Klein et al., 1987). More broadly, recent studies
argue that equity compensation can lead employees to psychologically identify with the
firm, thus aligning incentives and creating employee loyalty (Stiglitz, 2000; Kruse et al.,
2008; Pierce et al., 2001). Beyond the possibility of inducing employees to work harder,
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academics have also proposed alternative explanations for these compensation practices,
such as retention and sorting benefits (Oyer, 2004; Lazear, 2004; Hales et al. 2012).
However, empirical evidence of the performance effects of broad-based equity
compensation, whether due to improved effort, reduced turnover, or employee sorting, is
limited. This chapter seeks to address this gap in the literature by examining monthly unit
performance in a large retail firm that uses an ESOP plan.
Prior research on the performance effects of equity compensation has relied on
broad samples to study variation across firms, but the endogenous choice to offer equity
compensation has made it difficult to draw inferences (Hochberg and Lindsay, 2010;
Sesil and Lin, 2011). In contrast, I study the performance effects of employee ownership
within a single firm, and therefore participation in the plan is relatively exogenous at the
unit level. In addition, whereas prior research has used company-level summary measures
of performance, I examine the effects at the business unit level. By removing layers of
performance aggregation implicit in a broad, cross-sectional research design, I am
potentially able to construct more powerful tests of the effects of equity compensation on
ownership.
I find that equity compensation, in the form of an ESOP, is associated with storelevel performance. Specifically, at the store level, a one standard deviation increase in the
dollar value of stock grants to entry-level employees is associated with an increase in
monthly profits of 2.3%, after accounting for the cost of the grants. A one-standard
deviation increase in grants to store managers is associated with an increase in profits of
5.8%. In addition, I take advantage of the detailed personnel data to test whether reduced
employee turnover is a channel through which performance effects manifest. I find that
44

equity compensation is associated with reduced employee turnover, and reduced turnover
is associated with better profitability.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, in showing that
participation in an employee share ownership plan is positively associated with unit
performance, I add support for the contention that firm-level incentives can impact
individual behavior. Prevailing theories in the economics and related literatures do not
predict observed levels of broad-based equity compensation, and so equity compensation
provides a particularly stark contrast between observed practice and academic theory
(Hall and Murphy, 2003).
Anecdotal evidence collected from my field setting provides insight into the
equity compensation puzzle. To this point, explanations in the economics literature for
why effort incentives from equity compensation may not be undone by freeriding are
based on mutual monitoring and sanctioning (Kandel and Lazear, 1992). However, in
interviews with store-level employees, the dominant belief was that, contrary to
economic theory, individual performance does have an impact on firm performance.
Therefore, in addition to cooperative behavior, I propose an explanation based on
employee beliefs.43 To the extent that these “behavioral” factors have not been
adequately modeled in the prior economics literature, this study provides a potential
explanation for the inability of economic theory to predict observed compensation
practices.
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In a similar vein, Bergmann and Jenter (2007) argue that broad-based options plans may be motivated by
employee optimism, causing employees to “overpay” (in terms of forgone cash compensation) for equity
compensation.
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Second, by documenting an association between ownership and turnover, I add
support to recent theoretical arguments suggesting that retention concerns are important
motivations for equity compensation plans (e.g., Oyer and Schaefer, 2005). These
findings contribute to the literature on the relative importance of different compensation
objectives as motivating the use of equity compensation (e.g., Gerakos et al., 2012; Core
and Guay, 2001; Oyer, 2004; Oyer and Schaefer, 2005).
Finally, an important contribution of this study is that I document performance
effects of equity compensation for employees below the executive level. To this point,
the majority of research in this area has focused on CEOs and other “top 5” executives
(e.g., Hanlon et al., 2003), even though the large majority of equity compensation is
granted below the executive level.44 Prior studies that do look below the executive level
have either focused on industries characterized by knowledge workers (e.g., Ittner et al.,
2003), or else do not differentiate among employee types across broad cross sections of
industries. In this paper, I focus exclusively on ownership among retail store employees.
At lower levels of an organization, individual effort is likely to have minimal impact on
stock price, and thus incentives provided by equity compensation to these employees are
expected to be particularly weak. By showing that employee ownership can improve
performance even among non-managerial employees, I potentially provide a lower bound
for the performance effects of equity compensation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, I
provide an overview of theoretical predictions about the performance effects of equity
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Hall and Murphy (2003) document that in their sample, non-executive equity grants accounted for over
90% of total grants.
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compensation. Section 3.3 discusses the sample and measures used for the empirical
analysis. In Section 3.4, I present my results. Conclusions are provided in section 3.5.

3.2. Background and Hypotheses
Equity compensation for non-executive employees is increasingly common. As of
2010, approximately 28 million private-sector employees in the U.S. hold stock or
options through broad-based option and restricted stock plans, ESOPs, or stock-based
employer contributions to individual 401(k) accounts (NCEO, 2013). This makes up over
a third of all workers employed by for-profit corporations. As equity represents an
increasingly important component in compensation contracts, academics are interested in
understanding the motivation behind this practice, and its effects. The primary rationale
offered in the academic and practitioner literature is that equity compensation aligns
employees’ interests with outside shareholders’ (e.g., Kruse et al., 2008; Stack, 2003;
Rosen et al., 2007). For example, Mitchell and Utkus (2003) discuss the perceived
benefits driving the popularity of equity compensation and note, “The goal of employee
ownership of the firm’s shares…is to increase efficiency, worker productivity, employee
morale, and, ultimately, the firm’s value” (p. 23). Proponents of equity compensation
argue that tying employees’ payoffs to firm-level outcomes provides incentives to
increase effort, cooperation, and innovation, because employees share in the
corresponding profit increases.
However, many economists have questioned the incentive-based explanations for
equity compensation. Broad-based equity plans distribute ownership among lower levels
of the employee hierarchy, where individual actions are expected to have negligible
impact on firm performance. Moreover, because rewards for an individual’s efforts are
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shared so diffusely among shareholders, the pay-for-performance link is particularly
weak, and incentives to freeride likely dominate rewards for higher effort (Alchian and
Demsetz, 1972). Providing equity compensation to these employees is therefore
commonly assumed to have no incentive effects (Oyer, 2004). The popularity of broadbased equity compensation is viewed as inconsistent with economic theory, and
academics have thus turned to alternative (i.e., non-incentive-based) motivations for these
compensation practices: retention (Oyer and Schaefer, 2005; Oyer, 2004; Core and Guay,
2001), attraction (Oyer and Schaefer, 2005), cash constraints (Core and Guay, 2001),
accounting expensing rules (Hall and Murphy, 2003), employee optimism (Bergman and
Jenter, 2007), and favorable tax treatment (Mitchell and Utkus, 2003). While some of
these motivations imply direct performance effects of broad-based equity plans, others do
not. As Ittner et al. (2003) observe, the question of whether equity compensation is
associated with firm performance is thus “crucially important for understanding observed
compensation contract designs” (p. 96).
Empirical evidence for an association between broad-based equity compensation
and firm performance is limited, with mixed findings in the prior research. Several early
studies examine the performance effects of broad-based ownership using both crosssectional (i.e., comparing adopters to non-adopters) and longitudinal (i.e., comparing preand post-adoption performance) research designs. In their review, Kruse and Blasi (1997)
note that while these studies generally find positive performance effects (in terms of firmlevel productivity and profitability), only 3 of 21 studies report significant results at
conventional levels. However, using meta-analytic tests, they conclude that the body of
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these early studies suggests positive and significant performance effects from broadbased ownership.
Two more recent studies examine the use of broad-based equity compensation in
“new economy” firms, and both find mixed overall evidence for performance effects.
Ittner et al. (2003), in exploratory analyses, find that lower than expected option holdings
for non-executive employees are associated with lower subsequent accounting and stock
price performance, but also find that lower than expected overall equity holdings are
associated with increased stock returns. Moreover, the authors conclude that their tests
provide little evidence that equity grants to lower-level employees are associated with
performance effects. In a related study, Sesil et al. (2002) find that while firms with
broad-based option plans have higher Tobin’s Q, pre- and post-adoption comparisons do
not yield significant differences.
Recent studies using large, broad samples of public firms also report mixed and
conflicting evidence. Hochberg and Lindsay (2010) find that both the existence of a
broad-based plan and the level of implied incentives for non-executive employees are
associated with increased accounting performance. However, Aboody et al. (2010)
conclude that the incentive effects of option grants to non-executive employees are
negligible and do not manifest in firm profitability. Sesil and Lin (2011) find that broadbased equity plan adoption is associated with a short-term improvement in performance,
but the improvement does not persist beyond the first year after adoption.
Given the conflicting theoretical predictions for the effects of broad-based equity
compensation, as well as the limited and mixed findings in the prior literature, I
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investigate the performance impact of equity compensation in my sample firm. My first
hypothesis (in alternative form) is as follows:
H1: Equity compensation is positively associated with store performance
Several recent studies have discussed the importance of testing the effects of
equity incentives for executives (typically the CEO or “top 5” employees) apart from the
effects for non-executive employees (e.g., Oyer and Schaefer, 2005; Hochberg and
Lindsey, 2010; Sesil and Lin, 2011). However, below the executive level, employees are
typically treated as homogenous (see Ittner et al. (2003) for an exception). Employees at
different levels within the organization may respond differently to equity incentives
(Ittner et al., 2003; Landsman et al., 2007). For example, if entry-level employees have
lower expectations of the marginal impact of their effort, the pay-for-performance link
may be perceived as weaker and thus equity will have lower incentive value than
managerial employees. In addition, to the extent that employees at higher levels are more
likely to view their current employment as part of a long-term career relationship, these
employees are more likely to experience increased organizational identification and
commitment as a result of having an ownership stake, and therefore respond with a
greater increase in effort. Another reason for differential performance effects is that even
if equity compensation has the same motivational impact, entry-level employees may
collectively have less ability to impact store performance. To allow for differences in the
effects of equity compensation across organizational levels, I test for performance effects
for each level within the store hierarchy separately.
As discussed above, several recent studies have argued that employee retention,
and not effort incentives, is the primary motivation for the use of broad-based equity
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plans, and some studies have documented retention effects from various types of equity
compensation plans (e.g., Russell, 2006; Wilson and Peel, 1991).45 However, prior
literature has not tested for the performance impact of retention benefits from equity
plans, or examined the relative importance of employee retention apart from other
potential mechanisms (e.g., effort incentives). The following set of hypotheses (in
alternative form) addresses these two issues:
H2a: Equity compensation is positively associated with store performance
through an association with reduced employee turnover.
H2b: Equity compensation is positively associated with store performance after
controlling for its impact on employee turnover.

3.3. Data and Measures
Data for this chapter includes all units of a large retail firm located in the U.S. for
the years 2007-2009. Stores that do not have data over the entire period (due, for
example, to a store opening or closing during the sample period) are excluded from the
analyses. Monthly unit performance data were obtained from the company’s accounting
system, which combined with the firm’s employee records make up the primary data
source for this chapter.
The sample firm operates an ESOP, which has been in place for several years
prior to the sample period. Under the plan, eligible employees receive an annual stock
contribution from the company to an individual retirement account that is managed by a
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Research on the determinants of broad-based equity plans provides indirect evidence for retention
benefits from these plans (e.g., Core and Guay, 2001; Oyer and Schaefer, 2005, Gerakos et al., 2012).
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third party.46,47 The plan is structured as a qualified retirement plan for Federal income
tax purposes, which requires that plan provisions (e.g., eligibility cutoffs and vesting
schedules) conform to guidelines for tax-qualified plans outlined by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Structuring deferred compensation as a
retirement plan impacts the timing of ultimate payouts and the administrative details of
the plan, but otherwise the plan is very general in that it gives employees an ownership
stake in the company, and therefore ties individual employees’ payoffs to the
performance of the company (i.e., similar to restricted stock and stock option plans).48
Store performance. Following prior literature examining unit performance within retail
firms (e.g., Ton and Huckman, 2008; Glebeek and Bax, 2006), I measure unit
performance using store profitability. Profitability is defined as gross profit less shrinkage
and spoilage, and less wage expense, and is calculated monthly. This measure of
profitability is used by the firm to evaluate store financial performance. Because my
interest is in measuring the total impact of the firm’s equity compensation plan on unit
performance, including both the benefits as well as the costs, I construct a net
profitability measure by adjusting for the dollar amount of grants made to employees for
the current year.49 Since equity compensation is only granted annually, I estimate the
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Current employees are restricted from accessing their funds until after retirement. However, employees
can receive distributions from their vested plan holdings before retirement age if they separate from the
company for any reason.
47
For details on eligibility criteria and contribution rates, see section 2.2.2 of this dissertation.
48
Distributing shares to employees through retirement plans such as ESOPs or 401(k) plans is a common
means of promoting employee ownership (Mitchell and Utkus, 2003). The National Center of Employee
Ownership estimates that there are approximately 12 million such plans in the U.S. (NCEO, 2013).
Prominent examples of firms in the retail industry using these types of plans include Walmart and
McDonalds (Brightscope.com).
49
Adjusting for the cost of grants in this way is similar to the procedure used by Hochberg and Lindsay
(2010), although they make their adjustment for slightly different reasons. Hochberg and Lindsay (2010)
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monthly cost of grants for each employee category by dividing the total annual grants to
those employees (within each store) by 12.
Equity compensation. In general, measurement of equity compensation for non-executive
employees in the prior literature is limited by data availability, and requires numerous
assumptions. Moreover, differences in measurement techniques potentially contributes to
the mixed findings in the literature (e.g., Core and Guay, 2001; Oyer and Schaefer, 2005).
In contrast, I use detailed employee records to construct measures of equity incentives
more directly and with fewer required assumptions than has been possible in prior
studies. In broad terms, prior research has used three approaches to measure equity
incentives for non-executive employees. First, several studies measure equity
compensation in terms of the percentage of employees covered by the plan. For example,
Hochberg and Lindsay (2010), Oyer and Schaefer (2005), and Sesil et al. (2002) use
indicator variables for firms that have “broad-based” plans, defined as equity plans that
cover at least 50% of employees. An advantage of this approach is that it does not make
assumptions about how employees value their equity compensation or their conceptions
about the link between firm performance and individual payoffs. Moreover, theoretical
arguments in the management literature suggest that an important mechanism through
which equity compensation influences employee behavior is its impact on employees’
identification with the firm (e.g., Simon, 1991). It may be that the symbolic impact of
ownership per se, and not the dollar value of equity holdings, is the important factor
driving employee identification.

subtracted the Black-Scholes cost of option compensation to avoid a mechanical association with
performance through lower reported compensation expense.
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Second, recent studies measure equity compensation in terms of employees’ implied
incentives from holding equity. For example, Core and Guay (2001) and Hochberg and
Lindsay (2010) estimate combined portfolio deltas (i.e., the dollar change in wealth for a
1% change in stock price) for employees below the top-5 executives. An appealing
feature of this method is that it directly accounts for the fact that compensation plans
differ in the amount of equity granted, and the resulting differences in economic
incentives provided to employees.
Third, a related method is to estimate the value of recent equity grants to nonexecutive employees, rather than the entire stock of cumulative holdings (Ittner et al.,
2003; Kedia and Mozumdar, 2002). To the extent that current equity grants are more
salient to employees than grants made in the past, measuring incentives based on recent
grants may be appropriate.50
Because each of these approaches has its advantages, I calculate separate
measures of equity compensation that are conceptually similar to each approach. First, I
calculate the percentage of employees within each store that received an ESOP grant for
the prior year. As discussed in Chapter 2, eligibility to receive an ESOP grant depends on
reaching tenure, annual hours worked, and age cutoffs. Of the four hierarchical levels,
only employees at the lowest level exhibit meaningful variation with respect to these
cutoffs (and hence variation in the percentage receiving grants), and therefore I calculate
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Hochberg and Lindsay (2010) find that roughly 50% of the portfolio delta in their sample is due to
current grants compared to previous grants.
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this measure for CSR employees only.51 Second, I measure the average dollar value of
ESOP holdings within each store by dividing cumulative ESOP holdings by the number
of active employees. I calculate this measure for each level within the store hierarchy
separately. Third, I measure the average dollar value of the most recent ESOP grant
within each store, again separately for each employee level.
As discussed above, prior studies examining the relationship between equity
incentives and performance have either relied on variation in equity plans across firms or
compared pre- and post-plan adoption performance within firms. In contrast, my sample
firm had the same plan in place for all stores during my sample period. Therefore, to test
my hypotheses I rely on variation from three sources. First, for the CSR level, employees
vary in terms of eligibility to participate in the ESOP plan. Each of the three variables
determining eligibility (age, hours worked, and tenure) are potentially associated with
store performance, regardless of equity compensation. Therefore, I include controls for
the percentage of CSR employees achieving each individual cutoff. After controlling for
the individual determinants of eligibility, I interpret the coefficients on the equity
compensation measures as the effect of equity compensation apart from the effects of
employee tenure, age, and workload.52,53

51

Over 75% of employees above the CSR level are eligible to receive a grant in a given year (compared to
roughly 28% for CSR employees), and the remaining variation is almost completely determined by
employee tenure.
52
In additional analyses, I repeat regressions with and without each of the underlying eligibility factors.
Inferences remain unchanged, suggesting that results are not driven by collinearity with the underlying
eligibility criteria.
53
A potential concern is whether, after I have controlled for the underlying eligibility variables, there is
meaningful variation in the equity compensation variables. To address this, in unreported analysis, I regress
%received_grant on the three eligibility variables. While each of the eligibility variables is highly
significant, the R-squared of the model is .54, suggesting that at the store level, these variables explain only
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Second, while the fundamental structure of the ESOP plan was constant over my
sample period, the relative size of equity grants varied across years. Therefore,
employees hired at different times have different levels of equity incentives.54 Third, in a
given year the size of each employee’s equity grant is proportional to her total earnings,
so employees with different past wage rates and workloads have different levels of equity
holdings. I assume that after controlling for current wage rates and workloads (i.e., the
determinants of current earnings) past wage rates and workloads are not associated with
current store performance, except through their association with past equity
compensation.
Employee Turnover. I follow the convention established in recent studies on the
performance effects of employee turnover (e.g., Ton and Huckman, 2008; Siebert and
Zubov, 2009; Shaw et al., 2005) by measuring turnover as the total number of employee
separations in a period divided by the average number of employees active during the
same period. In order to allow sufficient time for the effects of employee turnover to
manifest in store performance, I calculate the average turnover rate over the prior three
months (Ton and Huckman, 2008). Turnover is measured for each employee level
separately.
Control Variables. In addition to the above variables, I control for other determinants of
store performance used in prior studies. I include store age, calculated as the natural log
of the number of months since the store opened. I also include store size, measured in
about half of the variation in %received grant. This is because employees can reach eligibility requirements
on one dimension (e.g., tenure) while failing to reach on another dimension (e.g., hours worked).
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As discussed, I control for employee tenure to account for differences in employee skills and knowledge
due to different lengths of experience with the firm.
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thousands of square feet. The participating company operates stores with two different
business formats, which differ with respect to the breadth of products offered. I include
an indicator variable, format, equal to one for stores with the larger product offering, and
zero otherwise. I include the median household income and population density, measured
at the county level from the 2010 U.S. census to control for differences in potential
customer bases. To control for differences across stores in potential labor supply, I
control for the local unemployment rate, calculated at the county level. I also include
month and year effects, to control for seasonality and time trends in the data,
respectively.

3.4. Results
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics.

As shown in Table 3.1, employee characteristics vary widely across hierarchical
levels, with tenure, workload, age, and wage all increasing at higher levels within the
store. As discussed above, these differences potentially result in variation in employees’
perceived ability to impact store performance and relative importance (both economical
and psychological) of equity compensation, and therefore support the need to examine
the effect of equity compensation separately for each hierarchical level. Not surprisingly,
there is also wide variation across positions in the average level of equity incentives. For
example, CSR employees on average hold $981 of company stock through the ESOP
plan (equity holdings), and that increases to $5093, $6534, and $19302 for hourly
managers, assistant store managers, and store managers, respectively. Also note that there
is substantial variation in the level of aggregate equity holdings across stores in the
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sample, particularly at the CSR level. For example, for CSR employees, going from the
first to the third quartile in equity holdings represents an almost 300% increase.
3.4.2 Analysis of the effects of equity compensation on store performance

Table 3.2 presents regressions of store performance on several different measures
of equity incentives, as well as controls for the employee characteristics underlying
eligibility, along with store characteristics. Panel A includes the analysis for CSR
employees, for whom I calculate all three of the primary equity measures discussed
above. Because of the time-series nature of the data (i.e., I observe the same stores across
many months), I report standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the store level in
these and subsequent analyses. As shown in Columns 1-3, each measure of equity
compensation is significant and positively associated with store profitability, with
significance ranging from the .01 to the .10 levels. The estimated coefficient in Column 1
suggests that an increase in the average grant to CSR employees of one dollar is
associated with an increase in store profitability (adjusted for the cost of grants) of
roughly $8.5.55 Note that since the average store employs approximately 22 CSR
employees, the company would have to grant in total an additional $22 to realize the
associated $8.5 increase in profits implied by the coefficient. As a way to gauge the
economic magnitude of this effect, a one-standard-deviation change in equity grant
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As discussed above, equity compensation is strongly correlated with the underlying eligibility criteria
(age, tenure, and hours worked), which are themselves likely to be associated with store performance. To
check whether my results are significantly impacted by multicollinearity, I examine variance inflation
factors (VIF) scores. The VIF scores are generally below 3, and therefore do not indicate serious problems
with multicollinearity. In addition, in untabulated analyses, I estimate separate regressions excluding each
of the eligibility criteria and equity compensation measure in turn, and inferences remain unchanged. As an
additional precaution, to control more flexibly for the continuous variation in the eligibility criteria, I
include up to 4th degree polynomials of each of the eligibility criteria as controls, and again inferences
remain unchanged.
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($260) is associated with an increase in store profitability of $2175. Similarly, a onestandard deviation increase in the percentage of CSR employees who received an equity
grant in the prior year (14.2%) is associated with an increase in profitability of $2032,
while a one-standard-deviation increase in the average equity holdings ($809) is
associated with an increase in profitability of $4738. Collectively, these results provide
consistent evidence for a positive association between equity compensation and unit-level
performance, supporting Hypothesis One. In terms of the other control variables included
in the regression, results are generally of the expected sign. Employee tenure is positively
associated with store performance, consistent with employees gaining ability and
building customer rapport with experience. While the negative association with the
percentage of full-time employees is not intuitive, it is consistent with the findings in Ton
and Huckman (2008). Larger and more established stores are more profitable, as well as
stores in wealthier and more densely populated areas. In addition, when unemployment
rates are higher, perhaps proxying for the availability of qualified labor, profits are
higher.
Panel B of Table 3.2 presents estimates for the effects of equity compensation to
hourly managers, assistant store managers, and store managers. As discussed above, for
each of these employee levels I examine only the average ESOP holdings and the average
prior-year ESOP grant, and exclude the percentage receiving a grant due to a lack of
variation in the data. However, for these remaining measures, there is a potential concern
that the lack of variation in eligibility induces multicollinearity among the equity
measures and the employee characteristics. Equity holdings for employees above the CSR
level has a particularly strong correlation with tenure, making it difficult to reliably
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estimate the unique effect of equity holdings apart from the effect of employee tenure.
Examination of VIF scores for equity holdings and tenure are between seven and nine for
each of the regressions using equity holdings, and the sign and/or significance of the
equity holdings and tenure coefficients change depending on whether the other variable is
included or not (in each case, omitting the control for tenure results in a significantly
positive estimate for equity holdings). While equity grant is also significantly correlated
with tenure, the correlation is much smaller. VIF scores for models using equity grant are
generally below two, suggesting that multicollinearity is much less a problem with this
measure of equity compensation. In other words, while the stock of equity compensation
is substantially determined by employee tenure, the flow of equity compensation is less
so. Therefore, the results reported in Table 3.2 and subsequent analysis focus on the
dollar value of equity grants. Turning to the results in Column 3 of Panel B, I find that the
dollar value of recent equity grants to store managers is significantly and positively
associated with store profits.56 Specifically, I find that an additional $1 granted to a store
manager is associated with an average increase in profits of $2.54. I am unable to find
similar evidence for an effect of grants to either assistant store managers or hourly
managers, as the coefficients on equity grant in both regressions are not significant.
However, omitting the control for tenure in either regression does result in significant and
positive estimates. Therefore, while I fail to document a unique effect of equity
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As mentioned, VIF scores following this regressing are generally less than two. In untabulated analyses, I
re-run the regression omitting either tenure or equity grant. While size and significance of tenure increases
with the omission of equity grant, the coefficient for equity grant remains relatively unchanged with the
exclusion of tenure, suggesting that the positive and significant estimate for equity grant is not due to
multicollinarity.
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compensation for these employees, this is possibly due to limitations in the data (i.e.,
multicollinearity).
3.4.3 Analyses of employee turnover as a mediating variable

As discussed above, recent studies have argued that employee retention, and not
the provision of incentives, is the primary motivation for the use of broad-based equity
plans (Oyer, 2004; Oyer and Schaefer, 2005). In this section I investigate whether
employee turnover mediates the effect of equity compensation on performance, and in
particular, whether the performance effects documented in the previous section derive
primarily from retention benefits. In the parlance of mediational analysis, equity
compensation in this case represents the “causal” variable, and store performance is the
“outcome” variable. To the extent that equity compensation impacts store performance
through its effect on employee turnover, employee turnover is referred to as a “mediator”
or “intervening” variable. The tests in the preceding section do not distinguish among
different potential mechanisms (or paths) through which equity compensation can impact
performance (e.g., retention vs. effort incentives), and therefore the coefficients are
interpreted as a “total effect.” In contrast, mediation analysis represents an attempt to
decompose the total effect into a direct and indirect effect. Following Baron and Kenny
(1986), I conduct the mediation analysis in four steps. The first step is to show that there
is an effect that may be mediated, in this case, to show that equity compensation is
correlated with unit performance. This step is documented in the previous section. The
second step is to show that the causal variable is correlated with the proposed mediator
variable (i.e., equity compensation is associated with reduced turnover), and the third step
is to show that the mediator variable is associated with the outcome variable (i.e., reduced
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employee turnover is associated with improved unit performance). The final step is to
investigate whether the causal variable remains significantly associated with the outcome
variable after controlling for the mediator. Steps two and three, in combination, establish
whether a mediating relationship exists; if the association between the causal and the
outcome variables is no longer significant in step four, the relationship is said to be “fully
mediated” by the intervening variable.
In light of the insignificant results for hourly managers and assistant store
managers in the preceding section (step one), in this section I focus my tests on CSRs and
store managers. In Table 3.3 I regress voluntary turnover on different measures of equity
compensation (step two). To avoid a mechanical relationship between turnover and
equity compensation, I measure equity compensation as of the end of the prior month.
Because the dependent variable for the CSR analysis (Panel A) is a percentage with a
large number of observations at zero, I estimate a Tobit regression with censoring at zero
(Trevor et al., 2008). For the store manager analysis (Panel B), I estimate logistic
regressions, where the dependent variable is an indicator set equal to 1 if the store
manager quit during the month. As shown in Panel A of Table 3.3, each of the three
measures of equity compensation is significantly associated with reduced voluntary
turnover. In terms of economic significance, a one-standard-deviation increase in the
percentage receiving grants or the average equity holdings is associated with a reduction
in the turnover rate of approximately .4 percent. Since the average monthly voluntary
turnover rate among CSR employees is roughly 5 percent, a .4 percent reduction
represents an improvement of between 8 – 9%. For the dollar value of the prior-year
equity grant measure, a one-standard-deviation increase is associated with a reduction in
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turnover of approximately .99%, or a roughly 20% improvement in monthly turnover.
Panel B shows that the dollar value of the equity grant for the prior year is significantly
associated with store manager voluntary turnover. However, the economic magnitude of
this effect is relatively small, as the odds ratio for equity grant is very close to one.
Table 3.4 reports the results of regressing store profits on employee turnover. For
CSR employees (Column 1), the association between employee turnover and unit
performance is significantly negative, consistent with prior research in retail firms (e.g.,
Ton and Huckman, 2008; Shaw et al., 2005). A one-standard-deviation decrease in
voluntary turnover over the prior 3 months is associated with an increase in store profits
of approximately $1,500. For store managers (Column 2), while the estimated coefficient
for store manager turnover over the prior 3 months is negative, it is not statistically
significant at conventional levels.
Table 3.5 presents results from regressions similar to those reported in Table 3.2,
but with voluntary turnover included as an additional control variable. The idea behind
these tests is to control for the “indirect path” between equity compensation and unit
performance via reduced employee turnover, so that the estimated coefficients for the
equity compensation variables can be interpreted as the “direct” effect (e.g., through
improved effort incentives). Comparing the results in Table 3.5 to those in Table 3.2,
both sets of specifications yield very similar coefficients for both CSR and store manager
employees. While the estimated effect of the percentage of CSR employees receiving a
grant is somewhat lower and of weaker significance, it is still positive and significant.
Combined, the results from Tables 3.3 – 3.5 suggest that employee turnover partially
mediates the relationship between equity compensation and unit performance for entry63

level employees, but not for store managers.57 These tests provide modest support for the
arguments in prior literature that retention concerns are an important motivation for the
use of equity compensation plans. However, in contrast to recent arguments that retention
is the primary mechanism through which equity compensation impacts performance (e.g.,
Oyer, 2005), I find that the performance effects of equity compensation persist even after
controlling for voluntary turnover.58
3.4.4 Vested vs. Unvested holdings

In the previous section I examine the importance of retention effects as a
mechanism through which equity compensation impacts store performance. I now turn to
a complementary analysis by examining the relative performance effects of vested and
unvested holdings. Economic theory argues that the unvested portion of equity
compensation is what drives retention benefits, because the unvested portion represents
the value an employee forfeits by separating from the firm (Kole, 1997; Core and Guay,
2001). If, as Oyer and Schaefer (2005) suggest, retention benefits are the primary
mechanism through which equity compensation to non-executive employees impact firm
performance, I expect the performance effects to be concentrated in the unvested, rather
than the vested, portion of equity holdings. On the other hand, if incentive provision is
the primary means by which equity compensation is associated with performance, then I
expect the performance effects to be concentrated in the vested portion of holdings.
57

In this setting, voluntary turnover among store managers is very low—less than 1% per month on
average. Therefore, it is not surprising that I do not find strong evidence of a mediating effect of employee
turnover among store managers.
58
As noted in prior literature, the uncertain timing of employee turnover’s effect on performance can make
it difficult to estimate the full effect of turnover empirically (Ton and Huckman, 2008). Moreover, it is
possible that the tests in Table 5 do not fully account for the true lead-lag relationships among equity
compensation, turnover, and unit performance. As such, any assessment of the relative impact of the direct
vs. indirect effects of equity compensation should be made with caution.
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Therefore, to test the relative importance of incentives vs. retention, I regress profitability
on both vested and unvested equity holdings. Results from this analysis are presented in
Table 3.6. In Column 1 I include the average vested ESOP holdings (among CSR
employees) only, and in Column 2 I include only unvested holdings.59 In Column 3 I
include both unvested and vested holdings in the same regression. The results across the
three columns are consistent with the performance impact of equity compensation being
concentrated in vested, not unvested, holdings. Consistent with the results from the
mediation analysis in the previous section, these results suggest that increased effort, not
retention, is the primary source of performance effects from equity compensation.
3.4.5 Economic vs. behavioral incentives from equity compensation

The preceding section provides evidence that equity compensation in the sample
firm impacts store performance primarily through increased employee effort rather than
through improved retention. However, as discussed previously, economic theory argues
that free-riding among employees (i.e., the “1/n problem”) is likely to diminish any
incentive impact from equity compensation. In contrast, behavioral theories suggest that
effort incentives from equity compensation stem from ownership per se, and not
necessarily from an explicit pay-for-performance relationship implied by the equity.60 In
other words, the symbolic gesture of sharing profits with employees through equity
compensation engenders identification with the firm, and therefore employees are
motivated to act in the best interest of the firm. In this section, I examine whether the
59

I focus this analysis on CSR employees only, because as shown in Section 3.4.2, the other employee
levels do not exhibit enough variation in ESOP holdings to uniquely estimate the effect of holdings on
performance.
60
For example, in a keynote address as Chief Economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz commented
that “Profit sharing, which in terms of standard incentive theories may be fairly ineffective, may still be
effective because of its effects in facilitating identification” (Stiglitz, 2000).
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performance effects documented above likely derive from economic incentives or from
increased identification with the firm.
Under the economics-based theory of equity incentives, the externalities between
individual effort and group payoffs will potentially give rise to increased mutual
monitoring among employees (Kandel and Lazear, 1992). Because an employee’s
reduced effort not only reduces her own potential payout under the equity plan, but also
those of her coworkers, coworkers have incentives to use peer pressure or sanctioning to
enforce acceptable effort levels. However, the incentives to employ mutual monitoring
likely vary with the cost of monitoring. To the extent that mutual monitoring is less costly
in stores with a high concentration of employees per square foot (Chen and Sandino,
2012), the economic incentive argument would predict that the performance effects of
equity compensation are greater in stores with higher employees per square foot. I
explore this prediction in tests reported in Table 3.7. I first calculate the ratio of
employees per square foot for each store, and create an indicator variable equal to one for
stores that are above the sample median.61 Columns 1-3 of Table 3.7 report regressions
which include interactions between this indicator and the different measures of equity
compensation. Across the three models, I fail to find a significant interaction between
equity compensation and my proxy for the cost of mutual monitoring (while none of the
interaction coefficients are significant, two of the coefficients are negative, in contrast to
the predicted positive sign). While failing to reject the null hypothesis does not represent
conclusive evidence against the economic incentive theory, it is suggestive that for the
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This approach is similar to that used by Hochberg and Lindsay, 2010). However, in their tests the authors
focus on the benefits of mutual monitoring (i.e., the proportion of employees covered by the equity plan),
whereas my tests focus on the costs of mutual monitoring.
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sample firm, employee effort motivation from equity compensation is more likely due to
increased identification with the firm.
As an additional test of the economic vs. behavioral explanations of equity
incentives, I examine the association between equity compensation and monthly
merchandise shrinkage. Chen and Sandino (2012) find that generous compensation
practices can influence employee theft, both directly and indirectly through social norms.
In this section, I conduct tests in a similar vein. In particular, I argue that under the
economics-based incentive argument, employees may be inclined to increase total effort,
but these incentives do not imply increased employee honesty manifested in lower
shrinkage. In contrast, if incentives stem from increased identification with the firm, then
I expect to observe reduced theft in addition to the effects on profit documented above.
Table 3.8 presents results from regressing measures of equity compensation on monthly
shrinkage. Columns 1-2 show that both ESOP grants and ESOP holdings are significantly
(at the .05 .10 levels, respectively) negatively related to shrinkage. In Column 3, while
the coefficient on % received grant is negative, it is significant only at the .15 level.
Overall, these tests provide evidence consistent with equity compensation providing
effort incentives through increased identification (Simon, 1991).62

3.5. Conclusion
The popularity of equity compensation for non-executive employees is a puzzle
for economists, and in particular the performance impact of broad-based equity plans is
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An alternative, but related explanation is that the equity compensation represents a form of efficiency
wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). With the equity compensation, employees receive higher total
compensation than could be achieved outside the firm. Employees therefore value their job more highly
and do not steal for fear of being fired.
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unresolved in the prior literature. In this chapter, I shed light on this issue by studying the
association between equity compensation and accounting performance using unit-level
data within a single firm. I find a significant positive association between equity
compensation and store-level performance. I add support for arguments by academics and
practitioners that equity incentives, which reward individual employees for firm-level
outcomes, can influence individual behavior. However, I provide evidence that
employees’ response to equity compensation is not necessarily driven strictly by
economic incentives, which economists have commonly predicted would be undone by
freeriding concerns. Rather, I provide support for increased effort due to behavioral
factors such as employee identification with the firm. These findings are important for
understanding the popularity of equity compensation for nonexecutive employees.
In addition to providing evidence for the overall performance effects of equity
compensation, the unique dataset allows me to provide novel evidence for the specific
mechanisms through which equity compensation impacts performance. While economists
have generally been dismissive of equity compensation inducing increased employee
effort, retention benefits have received support as the primary motivation for this form of
compensation. While I find that equity compensation can impact unit performance
through an effect on turnover, retention does not represent the primary channel. Instead,
this evidence suggests that increased employee effort is the primary source of
performance effects.
It is important to note that the findings in this chapter are based on data from a
single firm, and therefore extrapolation of results should be done with caution. For
example, while company culture and various forms of high-performance human resource
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management practices may be important to achieve desired outcomes from equity
compensation (e.g., Blasi et al., 2008), these factors are held constant in this setting and
therefore this chapter cannot provide insight into these moderating variables. A potential
limitation of this research setting is that the firm generally outperformed the stock market
during the sample period, which potentially contributed to employees’ enthusiasm for
holding company stock. Further research is needed to explore whether similar
performance benefits result from equity compensation when a firm’s stock underperforms
the market.
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Table 2.1:
Vesting schedule
This table presents the vesting schedule applicable to plan holdings. Vesting percentages are
applied to an employee’s entire account, rather than to a specific grant. Starting in 2007, the
permissible vesting schedule was shifted up one year due to a change in the Pension
Protection Act; this change applies to plan holdings received in 2007 and later. Vesting
percentages are based on the accumulation of “years of Service” which is defined as the
number of calendar years in which an employee works at least 1,000 hours.

Years of service

Vesting % for grants Vesting % for grants
prior to 2007
2007 and later

Less than 2 years

0%

0%

2 years

0%

20%

3 years
4 years
5 years
6 years
7 years or more

20%
40%
60%
80%
100%

40%
60%
80%
100%
100%
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Table 2.2:
Descriptive statistics
This table presents mean (Median) values of select variables for even sample years. Tenure is number of
months since employee was hired. Wage is measured in year 2000 dollars, and is scaled by the median
value for Customer Service Representatives (CSR) in 2000. Eligible is an indicator for whether the
employee meets requirements to receive a contribution under the deferred profit-sharing plan. Age
requirement, Tenure requirement, and hours requirement represent indicator variables for whether age,
tenure, and hours-worked eligibility requirements are met, respectively. Contribution % is the factor by
which eligible earnings are multiplied to determine annual contributions under the deferred profit-sharing
plan.
Panel A: CSRs
Year
2000
#Employees
9,545
Female
0.65 (1)
Age
30.25 (23)
Tenure
14.93 (10)
Wage
1 (1)
Eligible
.31 (0)
Age requirement
1 (1)
Tenure Requirement .47 (0)
Hours Requirement
.61 (1)
Contribution %
5.82
Panel B: Hourly Managers
Year
2000
#Employees
2,104
Female
0.71 (1)
Age
35.93 (35)
Tenure
26.31 (34)
Wage
1.27 (1.27)
Contribution %
5.82
Panel C: Assistant Store Managers
Year
2000
#Employees
188
Female
0.4 (0)
Age
36.12 (36)
Tenure
22.53 (24)
Wage
1.99 (2.01)
Contribution %
5.82
Panel D: Store Managers
Year
2000
#Employees
515
Female
0.52 (1)
Age
39.31 (38)
Tenure
34.85 (36)
Wage
2.34 (2.5)
Contribution %
5.82

2002
11,049
0.62 (1)
30.04 (23)
17.48 (9)
.97 (.96)
.22 (0)
.59 (1)
.45 (0)
.60 (1)
4.88

2004
12,284
0.6 (1)
29.76 (22)
19.34 (9)
.93 (.91)
.24 (0)
.58 (1)
.45 (0)
.68 (1)
6.49

2006
13,099
0.61 (1)
30.43 (23)
21.9 (10)
.96 (.94)
.26 (0)
.60 (1)
.48 (0)
.68 (1)
6.79

2008
13,674
0.6 (1)
32.13 (25)
32.05 (19)
1.01 (.99)
.39 (0)
.68 (1)
.66 (1)
.73 (1)
10.7

2002
2,791
0.68 (1)
36.59 (36)
36.76 (38)
1.31 (1.31)
4.88

2004
3,056
0.65 (1)
36.84 (36)
46.72 (43)
1.31 (1.28)
6.49

2006
3,193
0.63 (1)
37.37 (37)
54.86 (50)
1.35 (1.31)
6.79

2008
1,569
0.62 (1)
36.9 (36)
57.34 (48)
1.46 (1.47)
10.7

2002
162
0.39 (0)
37.19 (37)
34.10 (32)
2.06 (2.08)
4.88

2004
132
0.39 (0)
37.49 (38)
35.03 (28)
2.05 (2.12)
6.49

2006
161
0.37 (0)
37.42 (37)
39.14 (29)
2.12 (2.15)
6.79

2008
587
0.44 (0)
37.63 (36)
57.20 (45)
2.09 (2.08)
10.7

2002
558
0.5 (1)
40.09 (39)
53.82 (60)
2.39 (2.39)
4.88

2004
553
0.47 (0)
40.47 (40)
70.91 (84)
2.42 (2.35)
6.49

2006
583
0.45 (0)
40.71 (41)
84.12 (100)
2.84 (2.87)
6.79

2008
576
0.41 (0)
41.06 (42)
93.55 (102)
2.83 (2.87)
10.7
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Table 2.3:
Correlation tables
This table presents correlations among variables used in the empirical analyses. Variables are
defined in Table 2. Pearson correlations are presented above, and Spearman correlations below
the diagonal. All correlations are significant at the .01 level or below.

Female Age
0.13

Female

Hourly
wage

Weekly
hours

Tenure

Vested
holdings

Unvested
holdings

-0.02

0.03

0.11

0.03

0.01

0.15

0.21

0.38

0.23

0.15

0.30

0.29

0.35

0.18

0.31

0.29

0.30

0.57

0.17

Age

0.16

Hourly wage

0.05

0.46

Weekly hours

0.04

0.31

0.54

Tenure

0.10

0.34

0.63

0.37

Vested holdings

0.09

0.38

0.56

0.42

0.58

Unvested holdings

0.06

0.23

0.35

0.32

0.40
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0.09
0.58

Table 2.4:
Effect of plan eligibility on voluntary turnover
This table presents results of estimating Cox proportional hazard models of the rate of
voluntary monthly turnover. All coefficients are exponentiated to represent hazard ratios.
Values below one represent a reduced rate of turnover, and values above one indicate an
increased rate of turnover. A value of one indicates no effect on turnover. Eligible is an
indicator equal to 1 if an employee is over 21 years old (for years after 2002), has tenure >= 12
months, and works at least 20 hours/week, and equal to 0 otherwise. Unemployment is the
county-level unemployment rate, measured monthly. Older is an indicator variable equal to one
if an employee is over 30 years old. Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the
employee level. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Eligible

0.630***
(-43.154)
0.970***
(-4.308)
0.709***
(-35.917)
0.998***
(-6.151)

0.815***
(-18.679)
0.983**
(-2.518)
0.870***
(-15.780)
0.998***
(-5.859)
0.965***
(-58.225)
0.968***
(-11.366)

0.846***
(-15.215)
1.003
(0.502)
0.893***
(-13.032)
0.997***
(-9.955)

0.926***
(-4.831)
1.026***
(3.690)
0.892***
(-13.172)
0.997***
(-10.004)

0.987
(-1.040)
1.006
(0.970)
0.888***
(-13.710)
1.002***
(4.398)

0.972***
(-9.853)

0.972***
(-9.901)
0.871***
(-7.748)

0.972***
(-9.992)

Female
hourly_wage
Age
Tenure
unemployment

0.963***
(-12.533)

eligiblexfemale

0.917***
(-5.371)
0.648***
(-23.515)

Older
eligiblexolder
Higher order tenure and hours
controls
Year and month fixed effects
Observations
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

No
Yes
139,639

No
Yes
137,850
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Yes
Yes
137,850

Yes
Yes
137,850

Yes
Yes
137,850

Table 2.5:
Effect of age-21 requirement on voluntary turnover
This table presents results of estimating Cox proportional hazard models of the rate of voluntary
monthly turnover. The sample for this test includes only employees ages 18-20 for the years
1999-2004. All coefficients are exponentiated to represent hazard ratios. Values below one
represent a reduced rate of turnover, and values above one indicate an increased rate of
turnover. A value of one indicates no effect on turnover. Pre_02 is an indicator variable equal to
one if the year is less than 2002. Turnover_21 is the average turnover rate for 21-year-old
employees and is measured monthly. Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the
employee level. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

pre_02

1.017

1.073

(0.314)

(1.004)

0.939

0.960

(-1.621)

(-0.926)

Female
pre_02xfemale

0.910
(-1.147)
1.030***

1.030***

(2.587)

(2.579)

0.984***

0.984***

(-5.177)

(-5.165)

0.668***

0.666***

(-6.636)

(-6.739)

0.907**

0.907**

(-2.492)

(-2.485)

0.911***

0.911***

(-5.422)

(-5.419)

Month fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Observations

52,469

52,469

turnover_21
hours_per_week
hourly_wage
Age
unemployment

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6:
Effect of tenure-based eligibility requirement on voluntary turnover
This table presents results of estimating Cox proportional hazard models of the rate of voluntary
monthly turnover. The sample for this test includes only observations in the 12-month period
around the 12-month tenure cutoff for eligibility (i.e., +/- six months). All coefficients are
exponentiated to represent hazard ratios. Values below one represent a reduced rate of turnover,
and values above one indicate an increased rate of turnover. A value of one indicates no effect
on turnover. Over_12 is an indicator for whether tenure is greater than 12 months. Eligible_12 is
an indicator for whether, in the absence of a tenure requirement, an employee would be eligible
to receive deferred compensation. Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the employee
level. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

over_12

0.774***
(-4.020)
0.899***
(-3.101)
0.973
(-0.400)

0.792***
(-2.995)
0.892**
(-2.484)
1.018
(0.176)
0.940
(-0.679)
1.015
(0.272)
0.918
(-0.656)

0.657***
(-4.392)
0.891**
(-1.972)
1.151
(1.167)

eligible_12
over_12xeligible
over_12xover_30
eligiblexover_30
over_12xeligiblexover_30

0.946*
(-1.684)
0.754***
(-5.941)
0.978***
(-18.298)
0.988
(-0.917)

0.947*
(-1.668)
0.754***
(-5.935)
0.979***
(-14.118)
0.988
(-0.922)

1.280**
(2.411)
1.015
(0.201)
0.778*
(-1.721)
0.912*
(-1.792)
0.754***
(-5.931)
0.978***
(-18.302)
0.988
(-0.913)

Yes
48,530

Yes
48,530

Yes
48,530

over_12xfemale
eligiblexfemale
over_12xeligiblexfemale
Female
hourly_wage
Age
unemployment

Year and month fixed effects
Observations
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7:
Effect of hours worked eligibility requirement on voluntary turnover
This table presents results of estimating Cox proportional hazard models of the rate of voluntary
monthly turnover. The sample includes only employees on either side of the 1000 hour cutoff in
the prior year. Window sizes range from +/- 50 to +/- 200 hours. All coefficients are
exponentiated to represent hazard ratios. Values below one represent a reduced rate of turnover,
and values above one indicate an increased rate of turnover. A value of one indicates no effect
on turnover. Above 1000t-1 is an indicator for whether the employee worked more than 1,000
hours in the prior year and thus received a deferred compensation grant. Standard errors are
calculated by clustering at the employee level. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.

VARIABLES
Above 1000t-1
Male
Hourly wage
Hours per week
Age
Tenure
Unemployment

(1)
+/-50 hours
0.847
(-0.525)
0.950
(-0.292)
0.796
(-1.621)
0.947***
(-4.037)
0.987***
(-2.576)
0.995
(-0.820)
1.067
(0.985)

Higher order lagged hours
controls
Yes
Year and month fixed
effects
Yes
Observations
686
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(2)
+/-100 hours
0.694
(-1.377)
1.022
(0.175)
0.782***
(-3.426)
0.951***
(-5.417)
0.988***
(-3.363)
0.997
(-0.824)
0.982
(-0.392)

(3)
+/-150 hours
0.673*
(-1.863)
1.015
(0.143)
0.745***
(-4.622)
0.950***
(-6.611)
0.989***
(-3.852)
0.997
(-1.020)
0.992
(-0.212)

(4)
+/-200 hours
0.656**
(-2.285)
0.968
(-0.363)
0.771***
(-5.569)
0.948***
(-8.105)
0.988***
(-4.566)
0.996
(-1.624)
0.979
(-0.680)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
1,243

Yes
1,698

Yes
2,161
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Table 2.8:
Effect of plan changes on voluntary turnover
This table presents results of estimating Cox proportional hazard models of the rate of voluntary
monthly turnover. All coefficients are exponentiated to represent hazard ratios. Values below
one represent a reduced rate of turnover, and values above one indicate an increased rate of
turnover. A value of one indicates no effect on turnover. Year_2007 is an indicator for
observations in year 2007 (the year of the plan changes) and later. Contribution is the size of
annual contributions in dollars, scaled by the value at the beginning of the sample period.
Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the employee level. Robust z-statistics are in
parentheses.
VARIABLES

Eligible
year_2007

(1)

(2)

(3)
Tenure
between
24 and 36

(4)
Tenure
between 36
and 84

1.015*
(1.870)
0.764***
(-30.039)
0.979***
(-49.638)
0.995***
(-14.637)
0.940***
(-21.494)
1.034***
(5.516)

0.960
(-1.240)
0.949**
(-2.562)
0.876***
(-17.889)
1.003
(0.060)
0.950***
(-3.187)
1.018**
(2.223)
0.742***
(-30.483)
0.979***
(-47.348)
0.997***
(-7.252)
0.944***
(-19.319)
1.001
(0.194)

1.091
(1.576)
0.892**
(-2.369)
0.906***
(-5.463)
1.090
(1.101)
0.932***
(-2.680)
1.051***
(3.099)
0.719***
(-16.134)
0.973***
(-28.171)
0.984***
(-24.567)
0.932***
(-11.779)
1.028**
(2.053)

1.329***
(2.792)
0.735***
(-2.962)
1.017
(0.453)
1.103
(0.707)
0.879***
(-2.814)
0.976
(-0.706)
0.763***
(-11.303)
0.965***
(-16.790)
0.981***
(-18.665)
0.941***
(-5.271)
1.059**
(2.209)

Yes
Yes
122,784

Yes
Yes
120,700

Yes
Yes
32,702

Yes
Yes
10,904

0.884***
(-9.527)
0.691***
(-37.215)

contribution
eligiblex2007

0.861***
(-7.491)

contributionxeligible
Male
hourly_wage
hours_per_week
Age
unemployment
industry_turnover

Higher order tenure and hours
controls
Month fixed effects
Observations
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.9:
Effect of unvested holdings on voluntary turnover
This table presents results of estimating Cox proportional hazard models of the rate of voluntary monthly turnover. The sample includes only employees who are
not yet fully vested (i.e., employees under age 62 with less than 7 years of service). All coefficients are exponentiated to represent hazard ratios. Values below
one represent a reduced rate of turnover, and values above one indicate an increased rate of turnover. A value of one indicates no effect on turnover. Unvested
and vested holdings represent the dollar value of total vested and unvested plan holdings (in thousands), respectively. Standard errors are calculated by clustering
at the employee level. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
(1)
VARIABLES
Unvested holdings

(2)
hourly
manager

(3)
assistant
manager

(4)
Store
manager

0.739***
(-12.565)

0.999
(-0.029)

0.983
(-0.201)

1.188
(1.611)

1.002
(0.328)
0.895***
(-12.559)
0.998***
(-5.606)
0.970***
(-10.370)

0.932**
(-2.466)
0.934***
(-5.587)
0.994***
(-4.527)
0.955***
(-3.630)

0.758**
(-2.274)
0.904***
(-3.493)
1.014**
(2.439)
0.928*
(-1.829)

Yes
Yes
10,979

Yes
Yes
1,738

CSR

(6)
store
manager

(7)
assistant
manager

(8)
store
manager

0.701
(-1.279)
0.906***
(-2.600)
0.979
(-1.530)
1.100
(0.860)

0.731***
(-11.632)
1.023
(0.992)
1.002
(0.328)
0.895***
(-12.601)
0.998***
(-5.584)
0.970***
(-10.382)

1.007
(0.228)
0.983
(-0.768)
0.931**
(-2.468)
0.935***
(-5.556)
0.994***
(-4.472)
0.955***
(-3.640)

0.980
(-0.227)
1.011
(0.185)
0.758**
(-2.274)
0.904***
(-3.500)
1.014**
(2.383)
0.928*
(-1.824)

1.193*
(1.682)
1.049
(1.085)
0.730
(-1.127)
0.900***
(-2.827)
0.975*
(-1.668)
1.114
(0.997)

Yes
Yes
624

Yes
Yes
135,651

Yes
Yes
10,979

Yes
Yes
1,738

Yes
Yes
624

Vested holdings
Female
hourly_wage
Age
Unemployment

Higher order tenure and hours
controls
Yes
Year and month fixed effects
Yes
Observations
135,651
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(5)
CSR

Table 2.10:
Effect of investment allocation on voluntary turnover
This table presents results of estimating Cox proportional hazard models of the rate of voluntary monthly turnover. The sample includes only employees who
are not yet fully vested (i.e., employees under age 62 with less than 7 years of service). All coefficients are exponentiated to represent hazard ratios. Values
below one represent a reduced rate of turnover, and values above one indicate an increased rate of turnover. A value of one indicates no effect on turnover.
Unvested esop and unvested_diversified represent the dollar value of total unvested holdings (in thousands) invested in company stock and diversified mutual
funds, respectively. Vested_holdings represent the dollar value (in thousands) of total vested holdings (the sum of company stock and diversified mutual funds).
Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the employee level. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses.
(1)
VARIABLES
unvested_esop
unvested_deversified

(2)
hourly
manager

(3)
assistant
manager

(4)
store
manager

0.679***
(-9.891)
0.884
(-1.643)

0.975
(-0.453)
1.045
(0.475)

1.005
(0.050)
0.914
(-0.417)

1.216
(1.441)
1.128
(0.568)

1.002
(0.321)
0.895***
(-12.488)
0.998***
(-5.589)
0.970***
(-10.372)

0.932**
(-2.458)
0.934***
(-5.580)
0.994***
(-4.520)
0.955***
(-3.635)

0.759**
(-2.256)
0.904***
(-3.497)
1.014**
(2.436)
0.928*
(-1.811)

Yes
Yes
135,651

Yes
Yes
10,979

Yes
Yes
1,738

CSR

(6)
hourly
manager

(7)
assistant
manager

(8)
store
manager

0.702
(-1.275)
0.905***
(-2.600)
0.978
(-1.538)
1.103
(0.887)

0.667***
(-9.551)
0.880*
(-1.700)
1.028
(1.218)
1.002
(0.321)
0.895***
(-12.538)
0.998***
(-5.562)
0.970***
(-10.386)

0.985
(-0.268)
1.047
(0.501)
0.984
(-0.735)
0.932**
(-2.461)
0.935***
(-5.552)
0.994***
(-4.467)
0.955***
(-3.644)

1.002
(0.021)
0.916
(-0.409)
1.008
(0.123)
0.759**
(-2.256)
0.904***
(-3.502)
1.014**
(2.384)
0.928*
(-1.808)

1.217
(1.466)
1.141
(0.631)
1.049
(1.085)
0.731
(-1.124)
0.900***
(-2.824)
0.975*
(-1.659)
1.117
(1.016)

Yes
Yes
624

Yes
Yes
135,651

Yes
Yes
10,979

Yes
Yes
1,738

Yes
Yes
624

vested_holdings
Female
hourly_wage
Age
Unemployment

Higher order tenure and hours
controls
Year and month fixed effects
Observations
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(5)
CSR

Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the sample, separated out by employee level. All variables are
measured as of the end of the current month. For CSR and HM employees, variables represent the
average values for each variable within each store. For assistant store managers and store managers,
values are for the manager employed in each store as of the end of the current month. Under the sample
firm’s equity plan, employees must work at least 1000 hours during the plan year, have been with the firm
at least 12 months, and be at least 21 years of age. % full time, % tenure12, and % age21 represent the
percentage of employees who meet each of these eligibility requirements. Tenure is the number of months
worked at the firm. Equity holdings is the dollar value of equity held through the plan. Equity grant is the
average dollar value of the equity grant received for the prior year. Number of employees is the number
of employees in each category employed as of the end of the current month. Turnover is the number of
employee separations during the month, divided by the number of employees still employed as of the end
of the month.
Panel A: CSRs
Variables
% full time
tenure
% tenure12
% received grant
equity holdings
equity grant
age
% age21
number of employees
turnover

Panel B: Hourly Managers
Variables
% full time
tenure
% tenure12
% received grant
equity holdings
equity grant
age
% age21
number of employees
turnover

Q1
0.64
21.28
0.50
0.17
359.81
306.98
29.35
0.61
15.00
0.00

Mean
0.73
30.63
0.61
0.28
981.05
500.12
32.34
0.70
21.70
0.07

Median
0.73
29.07
0.62
0.27
784.32
465.19
32.10
0.71
19.00
0.06

Q3
0.82
38.69
0.73
0.37
1406.05
657.16
35.00
0.80
25.00
0.11

Std Dev
0.13
12.45
0.17
0.14
808.85
260.34
4.40
0.14
8.96
0.08

Q1
1.00
42.00
0.80
0.60
2658.81
1735.56
33.00
1.00
3.00
0.00

Mean
0.98
58.80
0.89
0.74
5092.78
2319.37
37.88
0.98
4.13
0.02

Median
1.00
57.25
1.00
0.75
4454.74
2249.22
37.60
1.00
4.00
0.00

Q3
1.00
73.75
1.00
1.00
6872.75
2908.99
42.50
1.00
5.00
0.00

Std Dev
0.07
23.87
0.18
0.25
3408.23
854.99
6.98
0.07
1.89
0.08
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Panel C: Assistant Managers
Variables
% full time
tenure
% tenure12
% received grant
equity holdings
equity grant
age
% age21
number of employees
turnover

Panel D: Store Managers
Variables
% full time
tenure
% tenure12
% received grant
equity holdings
equity grant
age
% age21
number of employees
turnover

Q1
1.00
21.00
1.00
0.33
223.97
1976.22
29.00
1.00
1.00
0.00

Mean
1.00
57.78
0.83
0.72
6533.87
2974.72
37.78
1.00
1.14
0.02

Median
1.00
49.67
1.00
1.00
4746.40
3641.14
37.00
1.00
1.00
0.00

Q3
1.00
90.00
1.00
1.00
10597.55
4101.06
46.00
1.00
1.00
0.00

Std Dev
0.03
41.52
0.36
0.43
6599.32
1554.58
10.07
0.00
0.37
0.19

Q1
1.00
66.00
1.00
1.00
10277.26
5242.30
35.00
1.00
1.00
0.00

Mean
0.99
92.33
0.99
0.96
19302.35
6087.04
41.35
1.00
1.03
0.01

Median
1.00
102.00
1.00
1.00
18799.92
6123.81
42.00
1.00
1.00
0.00

Q3
1.00
121.00
1.00
1.00
27274.30
7356.22
48.00
1.00
1.00
0.00

Std Dev
0.06
35.41
0.11
0.17
11448.01
2074.26
8.96
0.00
0.18
0.13
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Table 3.2:
Effect of equity incentives on store performance
This table presents results of regressing adjusted operating profit on various measures of equity
compensation. Operating profit is defined as gross profit less shrinkage/spoilage and wage expenses.
Adjusted operating profit is operating profit adjusted for the average monthly equity grant to employees
in each category. Store age is defined as the natural log of the number of months since the store opened.
The sample firm operates stores with two varieties of formats, which differ with respect to the breadth of
product mix. Store format is an indicator variable equal to one for stores that offer an expanded product
mix, and zero otherwise. Household income is average household income, in thousands of dollars.
Population density is the number of people per square mile. Local competition is the number of
businesses that operate in the same retail category as the sample firm. Household income, population
density, and local competition are all measured at the zip code level, as of 2010. Unemployment rate is
the county-level unemployment rate, measured monthly. All other variables are as defined in Table 3.1.
Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the store level.
Panel A: CSRs
Variables
equity grant

(1)
Adjusted Profit
8.476*
(1.793)

(2)
Adjusted Profit
5.864***
(4.061)

equity holdings

-23,506.583***
(-3.155)
9,179.632*
(1.665)
-15,468.634**
(-2.460)
-97.336
(-0.932)
3,952.028*
(1.688)
12.826***
(7.732)
14,390.259***
(2.977)
0.493***
(3.702)
2.248***
(6.765)
-593.251***
(-2.894)
1,506.792*
(1.735)

-24,412.659***
(-3.264)
7,257.733
(1.473)
-13,554.885**
(-2.235)
-152.966
(-1.450)
4,034.024*
(1.750)
13.021***
(7.819)
16,055.382***
(3.430)
0.517***
(3.930)
2.260***
(6.757)
-575.939***
(-2.860)
1,284.124
(1.510)

14,495.810**
(2.105)
-23,794.273***
(-3.123)
8,300.672
(1.594)
-14,173.149**
(-2.318)
-76.322
(-0.757)
3,781.086
(1.612)
12.810***
(7.702)
14,263.076***
(2.957)
0.498***
(3.745)
2.227***
(6.691)
-595.642***
(-2.907)
1,502.769*
(1.735)

YES
16,992
0.404

YES
16,992
0.411

YES
16,992
0.404

% received grant
%age21
%tenure12
% full time
wage
store age
square footage
store format
household income
population density
local competition
unemployment rate
month and year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(3)
Adjusted Profit
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Table 3.2 (continued)
Panel B: Hourly Managers, Assistant Store Managers, and Store Managers
(1)
Hourly
manager

(2)
Assistant store
manager

(3)
Store
manager

Adjusted Profit

Adjusted Profit

Adjusted Profit

Employee level
Variables

-0.897

0.665

2.545***

(-1.117)

(1.310)

(7.740)

165.475***

21.057

28.452

(4.425)

(0.923)

(1.437)

100.546***

-74.369***

139.949***

(3.881)

(-2.612)

(9.083)

-376.741***

-147.368**

27.571

(-3.332)

(-2.093)

(0.361)

280.913

83.326

-188.707

(1.538)

(0.500)

(-1.167)

4,054.470*

4,864.067*

7,171.604***

(1.751)

(1.804)

(3.169)

12.356***

13.104***

7.666***

(7.557)

(7.337)

(5.836)

16,015.011***

18,254.424***

12,162.238***

(3.358)

(3.383)

(2.950)

0.537***

0.709***

0.344***

(4.059)

(5.052)

(2.810)

2.150***

2.504***

1.549***

(6.376)

(6.271)

(4.797)

-707.614***

-772.850***

-539.167***

(-3.420)

(-3.234)

(-3.078)

1,425.232

2,605.197***

831.010

(1.587)

(2.887)

(0.922)

YES

YES

YES

Observations

16,967

10,965

16,585

R-squared

0.411

0.420

0.514

equity grant
tenure
wage
age
workload
store age
square footage
store format
household income
population density
local competition
unemployment rate

Year and Month Fixed effects

Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.3:
Mediation analysis—effect of equity compensation on employee turnover
Panel A of this table presents Tobit regressions of voluntary turnover on equity compensation, with
voluntary turnover censored at zero. Voluntary turnover is measured as the number of CSR employees
who quit in the current month, divided by the number of CSR employees working as of the end of the
month. Panel B presents a logistic regression of Voluntary Turnover. For the logistic regression,
voluntary turnover is an indicator variable set equal to one if the store manager quit in the current month,
and zero otherwise. For Panel A and B, all equity compensation variables are measured as of the end of
the prior month. All variables are as defined in previous tables. Standard errors are calculated by
clustering at the store level.
Panel A: CSR employees
Variables
equity grant

(1)

(2)

(3)

Voluntary turnover

Voluntary Turnover

Voluntary Turnover

-0.004***
(-5.809)
-3.165***

equity holdings

(-3.177)
-0.001***

% received grant

(-2.702)
-0.005

-0.644

-0.939

(-0.006)

(-0.761)

(-1.118)

%age21

-6.626***

-7.497***

-8.085***

(-8.709)

(-9.805)

(-10.690)

% full time

-3.218***

-4.518***

-5.049***

(-3.807)

(-5.554)

(-6.198)

-0.021*

-0.032***

-0.027**

(-1.899)

(-3.001)

(-2.498)

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

(-0.145)

(-0.251)

(-0.235)

-0.000**

-0.000**

-0.000**

(-2.389)

(-2.267)

(-2.258)

%tenure12

wage
household income
population density
local competition
unemployment rate

Month and Year Fixed Effects
Observations

-0.014

-0.012

-0.015

(-0.724)

(-0.598)

(-0.781)

0.021

0.013

0.035

(0.285)

(0.179)

(0.461)

YES

YES

YES

16,520

16,520

16,520

Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.3 (continued)
Panel B: Store managers
Variables
equity grant
age
tenure
workload
wage
household income
population density
local competition
unemployment rate

Month and Year Fixed Effects
Observations

(1)
Voluntary Turnover
-0.001***
(-22.490)
0.019*
(1.863)
0.014***
(6.119)
0.060***
(2.741)
0.000
(0.159)
0.000
(0.244)
0.000
(0.394)
0.008
(0.426)
-0.065
(-0.879)
YES
16,128

Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4:
Mediation analysis—effect
performance

of

employee

turnover

on

store

This table presents the results of regressing adjusted profits on employee turnover.
Turnover3 represents the number of employees who quit over the prior three months,
divided by the average number of active employees during the same period. Columns
1 and 2 report results for CSR and store manager-level employees, respectively. All
variables are as defined previously. Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the
store level.

Employee level
Variables
turnover 3
wage
store age
square footage
store format
household income
population density
local competition
unemployment rate

Month and Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(1)
CSR
Store Profits

(2)
Store manager
Store Profits

-11,077.997***
(-2.754)
-105.092
(-1.193)
4,765.631*
(1.963)
12.919***
(7.661)
15,582.080***
(3.196)
0.556***
(4.163)
2.227***
(6.730)
-704.459***
(-3.349)
1,952.245**
(2.173)

-2,089.537
(-0.949)
167.253***
(11.186)
7,175.328***
(3.146)
8.054***
(5.923)
16,023.466***
(3.817)
0.366***
(2.882)
1.640***
(4.964)
-579.358***
(-3.151)
1,131.402
(1.240)

YES
16,520
0.400

YES
16,744
0.500
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Table 3.5:
Mediation analysis—effect of equity compensation, controlling for effect of turnover
This table presents the results of regressing adjusted profit on equity compensation while controlling for employee turnover. Columns
1—3 are for CSR employees, and Column 4 presents results for store managers. All variables are as defined previously. Standard
errors are calculated by clustering at the store level.
Employee level
Variables
equity grant

(1)
CSR
Adjusted Profit

(2)
CSR
Adjusted Profit

8.493*
(1.780)

2.545***
(7.749)

-8,879.997**
(-2.265)
6,853.498
(1.224)
-23,457.581***
(-3.132)
-15,397.666**
(-2.422)
-100.113
(-0.951)

-8,587.398**
(-2.227)
5,097.777
(1.017)
-24,286.433***
(-3.238)
-13,409.236**
(-2.196)
-153.014
(-1.442)

13,304.968*
(1.925)
-8,616.195**
(-2.213)
6,505.100
(1.226)
-23,466.370***
(-3.066)
-13,771.338**
(-2.232)
-76.910
(-0.759)

YES
YES
16,520
0.409

YES
YES
16,520
0.416

YES
YES
16,520
0.409

% received grant

tenure
age
workload
wage
Store and Location controls
Month and Year Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(4)
Store manager
Adjusted Profit

5.732***
(3.952)

equity holdings

turnover3

(3)
CSR
Adjusted Profit
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-630.702
(-0.288)
28.339
(1.427)
27.457
(0.360)
-188.122
(-1.161)
139.969***
(9.083)
YES
YES
16,585
0.514

Table 3.6:
Effect of vested vs. unvested equity holdings on store performance
This table presents the results of regressing adjusted performance on vested and unvested equity
holdings, both separately (Columns 1 and 2) and together (Column 3). All variables are as defined
previously. Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the store level.

Variables
vested equity holdings

(1)

(2)

(3)

Adjusted Profit

Adjusted Profit

Adjusted Profit

5.845***

5.899***

(3.995)

(4.040)
0.002

3.257

(0.000)

(0.508)

8,504.566*

14,087.343**

7,770.605

(1.706)

(2.583)

(1.565)

%age21

-23,630.080***

-20,453.411***

-24,088.320***

(-3.168)

(-2.763)

(-3.240)

% full time

-12,739.419**

-10,588.865*

-13,208.297**

(-2.094)

(-1.713)

(-2.209)

-149.588

-63.102

-152.107

unvested equity holdings
%tenure12

wage

(-1.422)

(-0.631)

(-1.442)

4,084.903*

3,938.185*

4,057.736*

(1.768)

(1.670)

(1.753)

13.008***

12.782***

13.016***

(7.784)

(7.645)

(7.806)

16,160.344***

14,227.801***

16,116.412***

(3.445)

(2.921)

(3.431)

0.520***

0.494***

0.518***

(3.955)

(3.696)

(3.940)

2.259***

2.238***

2.259***

(6.732)

(6.689)

(6.746)

-572.174***

-595.584***

-574.091***

(-2.837)

(-2.890)

(-2.845)

1,290.135

1,539.428*

1,284.944

(1.519)

(1.775)

(1.512)

YES

YES

YES

Observations

16,992

16,992

16,992

R-squared

0.411

0.402

0.411

store age
square footage
store format
household income
population density
local competition
unemployment rate

Month and year fixed effects

Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7:
Moderating effect of mutual monitoring
This table presents results of regressing adjusted profits on the interaction between equity compensation
and employee concentration. Employee concentration is an indicator variable equal to one if the number
of employees per square foot is above the sample mean, and zero otherwise. All other variables are as
defined previously. Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the store level.
(1)

(2)

(3)

Variables

Adjusted Profit

Adjusted Profit

Adjusted Profit

employee concentration

26,884.369***

24,701.593***

26,521.187***

(8.745)

(8.713)

(10.330)

% received grant

19,114.026***
(2.830)

employee concentrationx%received grant

-8,742.843
(-1.090)
12.224***

equity grant

(3.025)
-0.191

employee concentrationxequity grant

(-0.046)
5.903***

equity holdings

(4.086)
-2.351

employee concentrationxequity holdings

(-1.598)
%tenure12
%age21
% full time

7,835.626*

7,193.498

8,209.644*

(1.767)

(1.523)

(1.928)

-17,325.614**

-18,241.222***

-16,886.716**

(-2.550)

(-2.745)

(-2.527)

14,817.834**

11,651.921**

15,791.307***

(2.585)

(1.997)

(2.763)

-50.929

-87.389

-109.818

(-0.559)

(-0.927)

(-1.160)

Store and location controls

YES

YES

YES

Month and Year Fixed Effects

YES

YES

YES

Observations

16,992

16,992

16,992

R-squared

0.503

0.504

0.508

wage

Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.8:
Effect of equity compensation on merchandise shrinkage
This table presents results of regressions of merchandise shrinkage on equity compensation. Shrink % is
defined as merchandise shrinkage divided by total revenues, multiplied by 100. All other variables are as
defined previously. The coefficients on equity grant and equity holdings have been multiplied by 1000
for ease of exposition. Standard errors are calculated by clustering at the store level.
(1)

(2)

(3)

Variables

Shrink %

Shrink %

Shrink %

equity grant

-0.183**
(-2.181)
-.0367*

equity holdings

(-1.883)
-0.144

% received grant

(-1.447)
employee concentration
%tenure12
%age21
% full time
wage

Store and location controls
Month and Year Fixed Effects

2.925

4.655

3.922

(0.265)

(0.424)

(0.356)

-0.317***

-0.353***

-0.340***

(-3.995)

(-4.666)

(-4.213)

0.227**

0.204**

0.211**

(2.388)

(2.186)

(2.202)

0.110

0.057

0.071

(1.153)

(0.607)

(0.745)

0.001

0.001

0.000

(0.581)

(0.566)

(0.229)

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Observations

15,673

15,673

15,673

R-squared

0.122

0.122

0.121

Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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